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Novel questions raised by the war on terror and the evolv-
ing technology of warfare have highlighted the importance of 
executive branch legal interpretation. In particular, agencies 
often address difficult questions about the scope and applica-
tion of international law without review by Congress or the 
courts. The executive branch in the United States stands at the 
forefront of analyzing legal consequences following from the use 
of force—but the President may have to contend with conflict-
ing advice. 
For example, after September 11, 2001, President George 
W. Bush had to determine whether al Qaeda and Taliban figh-
ters were entitled to prisoner of war (POW) protections under 
the Geneva Conventions. As has now been widely reported, his 
advisers disagreed about what to do.1 The Department of Jus-
tice‘s Office of Legal Counsel argued that neither group was en-
titled to legal protection, although the President could choose to 
apply the Geneva Conventions to either group.2 The State De-
partment argued that the Conventions should apply to both 
groups and that a failure to do so would weaken the United 
States‘ relationships with its allies and undermine the ability 
 
 1. See generally JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND 
JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2007); JOHN YOO, WAR BY 
OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER‘S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR (2006). 
 2. Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and 
William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep‘t of Def. (Jan. 22, 2002) [herein-
after Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales], available at www.justice.gov/olc/ 
docs/memo-laws-taliban-detainees.pdf (including subject line ―Application of 
Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees‖). 
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to demand POW treatment for captured Americans.3 Military 
lawyers from the Department of Defense pressed for applica-
tion of the Conventions and argued that they were customary 
international law.4 President Bush ultimately determined that 
the Conventions did not apply to al Qaeda, because the group 
was neither a state, nor party to the Conventions.5 The Presi-
dent did not suspend the Conventions with regard to Afghanis-
tan, but found that the Taliban were ―unlawful combatants‖ 
who had lost their POW status.6 But it didn‘t stop there—after 
the President made his decision, memos from the State De-
partment expressing alternative views were leaked to the 
press, fueling criticism of the President‘s policy. More recently, 
reports have surfaced about internal legal disputes in the Ob-
ama Administration over whether congressional authorization 
was required under the War Powers Resolution7 for military 
actions in Libya8 and also whether the United States can law-
fully attack al Qaeda operatives in areas such as Yemen and 
Somalia, which are outside the battlefield theater of Afghanis-
tan and areas of Pakistan.9 
 
 3. Memorandum from Colin L. Powell to the Counsel to the President 
and Assistant to the President for Nat‘l Sec. Affairs 1–4 (Jan. 26, 2002) [here-
inafter Memorandum from Colin L. Powell], available at http://www.gwu.edu/ 
~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.26.pdf. 
 4. John Yoo, Administration of War, 58 DUKE L.J. 2277, 2290 (2009) (re-
porting that some Judge Advocate Generals ―challenged President Bush‘s de-
cision in February 2002 . . . that members of al Qaeda and the Taliban were 
not to receive the status of prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions‖ 
(citing Julian E. Barnes, Military Fought to Abide by War Rules, L.A. TIMES, 
June 30, 2006, at A1)). 
 5. Memorandum from George W. Bush, President of the U.S., to the Vice 
President, Sec‘y of State, Sec‘y of Def., Attorney Gen., Chief of Staff to the 
President, Dir. of Cen. Intelligence, Assistant to the President for Nat‘l Sec. 
Affairs, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Feb. 7, 2002) [hereinafter 
Memorandum from George W. Bush], available at http://www.pegc.us/archive/ 
White_House/bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf (including the subject line ―Hu-
mane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees‖).  
 6. Id. (―I accept the legal conclusion of the [A]ttorney [G]eneral and the 
Department of Justice that I have the authority under the Constitution to 
suspend Geneva as between the United States and Afghanistan, but I decline 
to exercise that authority at this time.‖). 
 7. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–48 (2006). 
 8. See Charlie Savage, Two Top Lawyers Lost to Obama in Libya Policy 
Debate, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2011, at A1. 
 9. See Charlie Savage, White House Weighs Limits of Terror Fight, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 16, 2011, at A1 (detailing dispute between Department of De-
fense general counsel Jeh Johnson and State Department legal adviser Harold 
Koh over the standards for the use of force outside the battlefield theater). 
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Internal disputes among the agencies that handle ques-
tions of international law are commonplace, although usually 
less visible. This Article examines how this internal dynamic of 
conflict and competition within the executive branch shapes the 
interpretation and compliance with international law—it 
presents a public choice analysis of how the United States com-
plies with international law. 
In the United States, even our unitary executive, which ex-
ercises significant control over foreign affairs, includes numer-
ous agencies that analyze and interpret the requirements of in-
ternational law within the framework of their particular 
interests and incentives. Lawyers throughout the executive 
branch work through issues relating to international law from 
the unique perspectives and cultures of their agencies. Execu-
tive branch processes for mediating legal disputes are irregular 
and inconsistent—they coordinate efforts at best imperfectly 
and at worst leave agencies to pursue conflicting interpreta-
tions of international law. The executive branch often behaves 
as a ―they‖ not an ―it,‖10 even with respect to questions of inter-
national law.  
This Article describes the particular interests and incen-
tives of the agencies that shape international law interpreta-
tion and the institutions available (or not) for coordinating in-
terests. Moreover, it identifies how disaggregated decision 
making and imperfect coordination within the executive branch 
affect international law compliance in the United States.11 Ana-
 
 10. This observation has been made of the White House in the context of 
the administrative state. E.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vanden-
bergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presi-
dential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 49 (2006) (―[W]e demonstrate that 
scholars may have underestimated the complexity of White House involve-
ment. Presidential control is a ‗they,‘ not an ‗it.‘‖). Kenneth Shepsle notably 
made a similar observation for Congress. See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is 
a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT‘L REV. L. & ECON. 
239, 254 (1992) (describing the ―meaninglessness of the concept of ‗legislative 
intent.‘ Individuals have intentions and purpose and motives; collections of 
individuals do not‖).  
 11. I focus on the United States because a public choice analysis must 
consider the dynamics within a particular institution. The public choice 
framework does not treat states as undifferentiated actors. Yet the conse-
quences of bureaucratic competition for international law compliance in the 
United States may shed light on international law compliance more generally 
if similar bureaucratic behavior is observed in other states. See infra Part 
IV.C. In other countries, there is some evidence of conflicts between agencies 
with responsibility for international legal policy. See, e.g., MICHAEL P. SCHARF 
& PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF CRISIS: THE ROLE 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER 169–74 
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lyzing these dynamics provides a richer explanation of how the 
executive branch interprets and determines compliance with 
international law. The uncertainty and instability of coordina-
tion provide an incentive for executive branch officials to com-
pete for control of international policymaking in the White 
House. This competition may result in exploiting the flexibility 
and ambiguity of international law to serve policy goals. Gov-
ernment officials may benefit from the indeterminacy of inter-
national law, particularly in relation to new circumstances for 
which these are few relevant precedents and limited if any 
state practice. 
This Article begins by situating the public choice analysis 
of international law. Part I briefly examines some of the com-
peting approaches in international relations and how interna-
tional law scholars have used them to address questions of 
compliance. Many leading approaches to international rela-
tions, including natural law, realist, constructivist, and institu-
tional theories, start with an assumption of a unitary state that 
behaves as a person in international law. In this view, states 
are ―billiard balls‖ or ―black boxes‖ with respect to internation-
al relations.12 These theories disagree about how states behave 
and, accordingly, make different predictions for whether and 
how states will comply with international law. For example, 
realist theories treat international law as largely irrelevant to 
the behavior of states, and rational choice theorists, such as 
Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner, have argued that states comp-
ly with international law only when it is in their self-interest.13 
In recent years, the unitary state model has been challenged by 
liberal theorists who have focused on domestic non-state actors, 
such as government officials and private interest groups. Nota-
bly, Harold Koh and Anne-Marie Slaughter have highlighted 
the disaggregation of the state in international law and identi-
fied how government agencies and officials as well as private 
entities engage in a transnational process of lawmaking and 
 
(2010) (recounting a discussion with foreign legal advisers about the role of 
international law in their countries and how their respective legal adviser of-
fices function).  
 12.  See, e.g., JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POL-
ITICS 11 (2001) (describing ―offensive realism‖ as treating ―states like black 
boxes or billiard balls‖). 
 13. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 1 (2005) (theorizing that ―international law emerges from states 
acting rationally to maximize their interests‖). 
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cooperation below the state level.14 Koh and Slaughter are 
largely optimistic about how the involvement of these non-state 
actors will improve precision and compliance with international 
law.15  
Unitary and disaggregated theories have largely talked 
past each other. Although some political scientists in interna-
tional relations have suggested that these approaches can be 
complementary, there has been little work in this direction by 
international law scholars. This Article provides one approach 
to filling this gap by analyzing how the executive branch tries 
to coordinate international law interpretation between agencies 
that regularly disagree and compete for control over foreign po-
licymaking. Like disaggregated theories, the public choice ac-
count looks inside the ―black box‖ to study domestic actors. Like 
unitary theories, it also looks at institutional mechanisms for 
coordinating agency interests in the formation of ―state‖ inter-
ests. The public choice approach considers the importance of in-
stitutional coordination mechanisms in addition to the particu-
lar incentives of domestic actors. It considers how the ―they‖ of 
the executive branch seeks to function as an ―it.‖ 
Part II sets forth the public choice of international law 
compliance.16 This public choice analysis examines how various 
legal departments within the executive branch interpret inter-
national law and thereby shape the scope and form of com-
pliance. A number of legal departments have responsibility for 
international law interpretation. As explained in greater detail 
in Part II, each of these agencies has a particular institutional 
perspective, culture, and set of incentives with regard to pro-
viding advice about the interpretation and application of inter-
national law. For example, the State Department Legal Adviser 
 
 14. Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International 
Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT‘L L. 205, 207 (1993) (stating 
that ―[ l]iberals focus not on state-to-state interactions . . . but on an analytical-
ly prior set of relationships among states and domestic and transnational civil 
society‖). 
 15. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. 
REV. 181, 206 (1996) (arguing that the theory of transnational legal process 
―predicts that nations will come into compliance with international norms if 
transnational legal processes are aggressively triggered by other transnational 
actors in a way that forces interaction in forums capable of generating norms, 
followed by norm-internalization‖). 
 16. I use the term ―public choice‖ because this Article analyzes the execu-
tive branch as a collectivity and examines the interests and incentives of the 
government officials who make determinations about international law. See 
infra notes 108–19. 
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often takes a conscience-based approach to international law 
and expresses concerns about diplomatic consequences. The 
Department of Defense General Counsel represents a military 
tradition and strong commitment to the laws of war. The De-
partment of Justice Office of Legal Counsel has an institutional 
perspective favorable to the exercise of presidential authority. 
The National Security Council Legal Advisor serves the Presi-
dent‘s interests and considers international law in light of the 
core constitutional powers and prerogatives of the President. 
Because of their different interests and perspectives, these 
agencies will sometimes conflict in their interpretation of in-
ternational law and the President will have to assess these dif-
ferent perspectives. Ordinary executive branch mechanisms 
avoid conflict on most run-of-the mill legal issues, however, 
disputes will frequently arise with respect to high-stakes ques-
tions. 
Part III explains how the executive branch has difficulty 
consistently coordinating these divergent interests. Bureau-
cratic competition is especially prevalent with respect to foreign 
affairs and national security because a number of agencies 
have overlapping jurisdiction in this area. Although several of-
fices have authority to resolve disputes over legal interpreta-
tion, there is no singular mechanism for resolving such dis-
putes. The unpredictability of this process encourages agencies 
to compete for control over international policy. Even after a 
presidential decision, agencies may continue to resist by ap-
pealing to Congress, the media, or other nations. Failures of 
coordination and uncertainty create an incentive for ongoing 
competition between different bureaucratic interests. Such 
competition may make it difficult for the President to assert 
and maintain control over agencies. Yet the President may 
benefit from a system that allows for the full exchange and con-
sideration of different alternatives with regard to foreign policy 
and international law. Institutions may be designed less for 
consistency and more for maximizing flexibility and respon-
siveness to particular circumstances. 
Part IV examines some of the consequences of the public 
choice analysis. First, this analysis may complement some uni-
tary theories by providing greater information about the actors 
and institutions that formulate state interests. In particular, it 
complements rational choice theories by looking at the incen-
tives of government officials who determine the inputs for the 
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state‘s interest with respect to international law and foreign 
policy. 
Second, public choice analysis predicts that ongoing compe-
tition between agencies will encourage them to take advantage 
of indeterminacy in international law. New types of warfare 
and evolving technological capacity make indeterminacy about 
the content and application of international law particularly 
acute. Agencies will use the imprecision or uncertainty of in-
ternational law strategically to suit their policy agendas. Re-
peated use of international law for political, strategic, and in-
strumental ends may create habits of flexible or instrumental 
compliance, rather than the more robust compliance predicted 
by liberal disaggregated theories. Whereas Koh and Slaughter 
predict that the involvement of non-state actors will result in 
greater compliance with international law, the public choice 
approach supports realist or rational choice predictions that 
states comply with international law when it is in their inter-
ests and not for other legal or moral reasons. Moreover, if gov-
ernment officials in other countries face similar incentives, one 
might expect international law to retain its actual or perceived 
softness. This provides an explanation based on sub-state in-
terests for why international law does not exhibit the clarity 
and stronger enforcement mechanisms often considered an as-
piration for international law.  
Disputes within the executive branch over the meaning 
and application of international law have important conse-
quences for our foreign policy. These disputes are often kept 
behind closed doors, but once revealed they provide valuable in-
formation about how the President assesses legal questions, 
particularly those arising from the use of force. The spread of 
the war on terror and technological advances that allow for in-
telligence gathering and attacks by unmanned drones present 
new and evolving questions under international law. The ex-
ecutive branch will have to assess these questions in the first 
instance as it determines foreign and military policy, often with 
only the limited involvement of Congress and the courts. The 
public choice approach provides one way to understand this dy-
namic and suggests some consequences for compliance with in-
ternational law. 
I. SITUATING THE PUBLIC CHOICE APPROACH   
Theories of international law compliance usually begin 
with some conception of the state and how it behaves in re-
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sponse to the requirements of international law. This Part pro-
vides context for the public choice approach by briefly consider-
ing some of the leading theories of international relations and 
international law and demonstrating the gap that is filled by 
the public choice method. 
The public choice analysis in this Article looks at the agen-
cies and individuals in the executive branch who determine 
compliance with international law—a disaggregated approach 
that focuses on domestic decision making. It looks inside the 
―black box‖ of the state and pulls apart the incentives and in-
terests of officials and bureaucracies within the executive 
branch. It then examines the available institutions and proce-
dures within the executive branch for coordinating and aggre-
gating these interests, and considers how these institutions af-
fect agency interests and incentives.17 While some theories 
focus on unitary state explanations and others draw on domes-
tic approaches, this Article seeks some combination by examin-
ing the domestic interests and incentives of executive agencies 
as well as coordinating institutions that bring together dispa-
rate and competing interests.18 It examines some of the domes-
tic interests that make up the ―state‘s‖ interest and behavior 
with respect to international law compliance.  
Furthermore, as I briefly explain in this Part, this Article 
focuses on the executive branch because of the central role that 
the President plays with respect to the interpretation of, and 
compliance with, international law. All three branches have 
important constitutional authority in this area, but the execu-
tive makes many of the on-the-ground decisions about interna-
tional law. Second, the characteristics of international law mat-
ter, and I explain the importance of areas of ―softness‖ in 
 
 17. See infra Part IV. 
 18. Political scientists have sought to open the ―black box‖ of states to see 
how domestic processes affect foreign policy and international relations. Some 
of the best work in this area has sought to bring together realism with a con-
sideration of domestic processes, studying how domestic preferences and con-
flicts are resolved through institutions that affect state behavior in interna-
tional relations. See, e.g., BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA & DAVID LALMAN, WAR 
AND REASON: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL IMPERATIVES 18–19 (1992) (―Our 
model of rationality, then, ultimately joins together the two main intellectual 
traditions in international relations: the realist viewpoint and the domestic 
perspective.‖); Helen V. Milner, Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthe-
sis of International, American, and Comparative Politics, 52 INT‘L ORG. 759, 
759 (1998) (observing that ―[t]he central paradigms of the field of international 
relations (IR)—realism and neoliberal institutionalism—have ignored a key 
aspect of international relations: domestic politics‖). 
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international law for predictions about compliance. Interna-
tional law varies both with respect to its level of domestic obli-
gation and also with the extent of its legalization. In particular, 
international law may be indeterminate as applied to new and 
evolving forms of warfare and technological advances. The per-
ceived or actual indeterminacy of international law affects how 
government actors interpret and apply international law by in-
viting policy judgments and allowing for a range of plausible or 
defensible interpretations. 
A. UNITARY STATE THEORIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
COMPLIANCE 
The traditional analogy between states and persons has 
served as a foundation for many different theories that disagree 
about fundamental aspects of state behavior, including why 
states formulate international law, and how and whether they 
comply with such law. Unitary theories put aside the individu-
als, entities, and interests that go into formulating state action. 
They model the state as a singular entity in order to provide 
theoretical predictions about state behavior with respect to in-
ternational law.  
1. Realism and Rational Choice Theory 
The natural law literature analogizes the state in interna-
tional relations to persons in the state of nature.19 The analogy 
envisioned both states and individuals as autonomous, liberal 
agents20 and drew from the analogy many of the traditional 
prerogatives of states, including the basic tenets of sovereignty. 
Accordingly, the state had the characteristics of an individual—
a singular unified entity that could act in the field of interna-
tional relations with and against other states. For example, 
Hobbes repeatedly drew a connection between man in the state 
of nature and nations in the international realm. The analogy 
between persons and states occurred in a context in which both 
 
 19. Edwin DeWitt Dickinson, The Analogy Between Natural Persons and 
International Persons in the Law of Nations, 26 YALE L.J. 564, 564–75 (1917) 
(discussing the analogy between natural and international persons considered 
by natural law thinkers such as Grotius, Hobbes, Rutherforth, and Pufendorf). 
 20. See generally RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: POLIT-
ICAL THOUGHT AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTIUS TO KANT 14 
(1999) (tracing the development of the analogy between the independent state 
and the liberal individual agent through modern political theorists and ar-
guing that ―there is no powerful theorist of a rights-based liberalism who has 
not subscribed to the basic account of the liberal agent‖). 
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people and states had only the most minimal obligations to one 
another and the primary motivation for both persons and states 
was self-preservation.21 The law of nations was like the law of 
nature—both operated in the absence of centralized enforce-
ment authority.22 
Drawing from natural law sources, realist theory developed 
at the beginning of the twentieth century posited that states 
have at their core an interest in self-preservation and the ex-
pansion of power.23 A state‘s interests may change over time 
and the methods of power may also evolve, but a state‘s beha-
vior will be determined by how it perceives its interests and its 
ability to exercise power.24 Structural realism focuses in partic-
ular on how the structure of the international system causes 
states to pursue power.25  
Both the traditional and structural variants of realism em-
phasize the unitary nature of the state, an entity with its own 
interests and motivations in international relations. Realism 
 
 21. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 189 (C.B. MacPherson ed., Penguin 
Classics 1985) (1651) (explaining that the basic right of nature ―is the Liberty 
each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation 
of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing 
any thing, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be 
the aptest means thereunto‖).  
 22. Id. at 394 (―[T]he Law of Nations, and the Law of Nature, is the same 
thing. And every Soveraign hath the same Right, in procuring the safety of his 
People, that any particular man can have, in procuring the safety of his own 
Body. And the same Law, that dictateth to men that have no Civil Govern-
ment, what they ought to do, and what to avoyd in regard of one another, dic-
tateth the same to Common-wealths, that is, to the Consciences of Soveraign 
Princes, and Soveraign Assemblies; there being no Court of Naturall Justice, 
but in the Conscience onely; where not Man, but God raigneth; whose Lawes, 
(such of them as oblige all Mankind,) in respect of God, as he is the Author of 
Nature, are Naturall; and in respect of the same God, as he is King of Kings, 
are Lawes.‖). 
 23. See HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 5 (2d ed. 1954) 
(explaining the main principle of political realism as ―the concept of interest 
defined in terms of power‖). John Mearsheimer explains his theory of ―offen-
sive realism,‖ which emphasizes that great powers ―look for opportunities to 
gain power at each others‘ expense.‖ MEARSHEIMER, supra note 12, at 5. The 
status quo is unstable ―because the international system creates powerful in-
centives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of ri-
vals, and to take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the 
costs. A state‘s ultimate goal is to be the hegemon in the system.‖ Id. at 21.  
 24. MORGENTHAU, supra note 23, at 8–9. 
 25. See generally KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLI-
TICS 81–99 (1979) (―The concept of structure is based on the fact that units dif-
ferently juxtaposed and combined behave differently and in interacting pro-
duce different outcomes.‖). 
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takes states as the units of international politics and empha-
sizes their essential similarity, rather than their internal dif-
ferences.26 As John J. Mearsheimer has noted, realist theory 
―tends to treat states like black boxes or billiard balls.‖27 It as-
sesses interests at the state level, as opposed to as an aggrega-
tion of preferences by individuals and entities within the state. 
These state interests are largely defined by the international 
situation that states face—i.e. anarchy, threats to security and 
dominance, and the mutual interest in cooperation.28  
In the realist view of international relations, international 
law has little role in explaining the behavior of states.29 Real-
ists have rejected the ―legalistic-moralistic‖ approach, suggest-
ing instead that states create and comply with international 
law when it serves their particular interests and not because of 
legal or moral obligations.30 International law reflects the in-
terests of powerful states and therefore the underlying balance 
of power between states.31 Without centralized enforcement, 
state compliance with international law is a function of self-
interest, rather than legal obligation.  
 
 26. See id. at 93–96 (emphasizing that states are the primary actors in 
the international sphere and that although varying in size and power, ―[s]tates 
are alike in the tasks that they face, though not in their abilities to perform 
them. The differences are of capability, not of function‖). Waltz argues that 
―[i]n defining international-political structures we take states with whatever 
traditions, habits, objectives, desires, and forms of government they may 
have. . . . We abstract from every attribute of states except their capabilities.‖ 
Id. at 99. 
 27. MEARSHEIMER, supra note 12. 
 28. See, e.g., id. at 10 (arguing that offensive realism ―assumes that the 
international system strongly shapes the behavior of states. Structural factors 
such as anarchy and the distribution of power . . . are what matter most for 
explaining international politics‖). 
 29. See Slaughter Burley, supra note 14, at 207–08 (explaining how real-
ists denied the relevance of international law in a realm governed by power 
and diplomacy). 
 30. See GEORGE KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1900–1950, at 95 (1951) 
(discussing the ―legalistic-moralistic approach‖); MORGENTHAU, supra note 23, 
at 10–11 (noting that political realism ―maintains the autonomy of the politi-
cal sphere‖ from the moral sphere and taking issue with the ―‗legalistic-
moralistic approach‘ to international politics‖). 
 31. See Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: 
Regimes as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 15–16 (Ste-
phen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (observing that ―[d]ominant actors may explicitly 
use a combination of sanctions and incentives to compel other actors to act in 
conformity with a particular set of principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures‖). 
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It is unsurprising then, perhaps, that realism has had few 
proponents among international legal scholars.32 As realism, 
and in particular structural realism, questions the importance 
and relevance of international law, international legal theory 
has often proceeded along different lines.33 Recent work in in-
ternational law, however, has leveraged realist international 
relations theory into international law by using rational choice 
theory. Rational choice theory posits a model of individuals who 
are rationally self-interested and make choices based on their 
interests and well-being.34 Similarly, states behave rationally 
when they pursue what is in their highest interest.35  
Describing international law through a rational choice 
model, Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner explain a state‘s inter-
ests as the ―state‘s preferences about outcomes.‖36 They argue 
that a state ―can make coherent decisions based upon identifia-
ble preferences, or interests, and it is natural and common to 
explain state action on the international plane in terms of the 
primary goal or goals the state seeks to achieve.‖37 Goldsmith 
and Posner thus take the state as a unitary actor that can for-
mulate goals and interests and work to actualize them through 
international law. 
In part, rational choice approaches arise as a reaction and 
critique of the predominant view in international law scholar-
ship that states can, should, and do comply with international 
law for non-instrumental reasons.38 Rational choice theorists 
 
 32. See generally MARY ELLEN O‘CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSIGHTS FROM THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EN-
FORCEMENT 57–98 (2008) (providing a helpful history of compliance theory); 
Jonathan D. Greenberg, Does Power Trump Law?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1789, 1792 
(2003) (explaining the relationship between realism and international law 
scholarship and noting that ―[ l]iberal international law scholars, dismissed by 
realists as hopelessly naïve, generally respond by ignoring or rejecting realist 
critiques‖). 
 33. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A 
Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT‘L L. 335, 337–38 (1989). 
 34. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Introduction to RATIONAL CHOICE 4 (Jon Elster 
ed., 1986) (explaining that to act rationally ―means to choose the highest-
ranked element in the feasible set‖ of alternatives). 
 35. See, e.g., ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A 
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 17 (2008) (―States are assumed to be rational, self-
interested, and able to identify and pursue their interests. . . . States do not 
concern themselves with the welfare of other states but instead seek to max-
imize their own gains or payoffs.‖). 
 36. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 13, at 6. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See id. at 14–16.  
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reject the idea that states have a moral obligation to follow in-
ternational law, separate from any rational interest they have 
in creating or complying with international law.39 At least they 
predict that states may have an interest in complying with in-
ternational law, but it will be for some reason other than a pro-
pensity to comply with international law.40 Thus, they explain 
compliance largely along realist lines—states comply when it 
serves their interests, broadly conceived, but not because of the 
independent pull of legal obligation.  
Rational choice theory, however, does not always support 
realist conclusions about international law. For example, And-
rew Guzman applies rational choice theory from an institutio-
nalist perspective. He explains how concerns for reputation can 
provide incentives for states to comply with international legal 
rules.41 A state will factor its reputation for compliance with in-
ternational agreements into the costs and benefits of deciding 
whether to comply.42 ―Because international law increases the 
costs of a violation, it puts a thumb on the scale in favor of 
compliance or, as is sometimes said, generates ‗compliance 
pull.‘‖43 
Although Guzman and Goldsmith and Posner disagree 
about the effects of international law and state behavior, they 
model the state as a unitary entity whose preferences and be-
havior are predicted with reference to the ―state‖ and its inter-
actions with other states.44 Moreover, in the view of rational 
choice theory, states have interests and act to pursue them in a 
rational way through international law, but ―have no innate 
 
 39. See, e.g., id. at 9 (observing that ―preferences for international law 
compliance tend to depend on whether such compliance will bring security, 
economic growth, and related goods; and that citizens and leaders are willing 
to forgo international law compliance when such compliance comes at the cost 
of these and other goods‖). 
 40. Id. at 10. 
 41. GUZMAN, supra note 35, at 34–36. 
 42. Id. at 40–41 (―When a state is deciding whether to comply, it will take 
into account a variety of cost and benefits unrelated to law—domestic inter-
ests, political relations with other states, and so on—but it will also consider 
the legal implications of a violation.‖). 
 43. Id. at 41. 
 44. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 13, at 5 (―Both ordinary language 
and history suggest that states have agency and thus can be said to make de-
cisions and act on the basis of identifiable goals.‖); GUZMAN, supra note 35, at 
19 (explaining the reasoning for adopting an assumption of a unitary state in 
his rational choice theory). 
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preference for complying with international law.‖45 States seek 
to maximize their own welfare and ultimately act based on po-
litical cost-benefit considerations with regard to international 
law. 
2. Responding to Realism 
Although realism remains a dominant perspective in in-
ternational relations, there are a number of competing theories 
that attempt to demonstrate the relevance of international in-
stitutions and define the international sphere through institu-
tional and social constructs. These theories create more space 
for international law, but like realism, they begin from a unita-
ry state perspective that takes the state as the unit of interna-
tional relations. 
For example, Alexander Wendt, constructivism‘s leading 
proponent, explains that the identities and interests of states 
are constructed by shared ideas, rather than, as realists main-
tain, given by nature or determined by forces such as power or 
dominance.46 Constructivism asserts that states can go beyond 
self-interest and act in ways that promote the collective inter-
est.47 Yet Wendt retains the state as the primary unit of analy-
sis and treats states as intentional or purposive actors.48 Al-
though non-state actors may increasingly affect and constrain 
states, ―system change ultimately happens through states‖ and 
 
 45. GUZMAN, supra note 35.  
 46. Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Con-
struction of Power Politics, 46 INT‘L ORG. 391, 396 (1992). 
 47. ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
242–43 (1999) (explaining that states see themselves as part of a ―‗society of 
states‘ whose norms they adhere to not because of on-going self-interested cal-
culations that it is good for them as individual states, but because they have 
internalized and identify with them. This is not to deny that states are self-
interested in much of what they do within the boundaries of that society. But 
with respect to many of the fundamental questions of their co-existence states 
have already achieved a level of collective interest that goes well beyond  
‗Realism‘‖). 
 48. Alexander Wendt, The State as Person in International Theory, 30 
REV. INT‘L STUD. 289, 291 (2004).  
To say that states are ‗actors‘ or ‗persons‘ is to attribute to them prop-
erties we associate first with human beings—rationality, identities, 
interests, beliefs, and so on. Such attributions . . . are found in the 
work of realists, liberals, institutionalists, Marxists, constructivists, 
behaviouralists, feminists, postmodernists, international lawyers, and 
almost everyone in between. To be sure, scholars disagree about 
which properties of persons should be ascribed to states . . . . 
Id. at 289 (footnote omitted). 
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―[i]n that sense states are still at the center of the international 
system.‖49 
Institutionalists pose another response to realism by focus-
ing on how states can cooperate through international institu-
tions. Robert Keohane argues that states ―build international 
regimes in order to promote mutually beneficial cooperation‖ 
and that such regimes ―reduce transaction costs for states, alle-
viate problems of asymmetrical information, and limit the de-
gree of uncertainty that members of the regime face in evaluat-
ing each others‘ policies.‖50 Keohane, however, starts from the 
same assumption of unitary, self-interested states put forth by 
realists.51 Although Keohane does not focus on international 
law, his approach focuses on international institutions that are 
often ―creatures of international law,‖ and his work has been 
imported into international legal discourse.52 
In political theory, scholars have reacted to realism by po-
siting cosmopolitan duties of states to protect human rights 
and meet other global responsibilities.53 Cosmopolitanism 
adopts a moral point of view that relates to global concern for 
the well-being of all persons, regardless of nationality.54 
Charles R. Beitz, a foremost cosmopolitan theorist, rejects real-
ist skepticism about the possibility of moral judgments in in-
ternational relations. 
Although cosmopolitan theory sometimes places responsi-
bility on individuals, a number of theories have shifted atten-
tion to institutions and focus on states and national govern-
 
 49. WENDT, supra note 47, at 9.  
 50. ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD 
IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY xi (Princeton Univ. Press ed., 2005). 
 51. Id. at 25. 
 52. Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and International 
Law, 100 AM. J. INT‘L L. 64, 79–80 (2006) (discussing Keohane‘s impact on 
―subsequent analyses of the relationship between international law and  
power‖).  
 53. See, e.g., CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 6 (1979) (arguing for the possibility of a normative political theory 
of international relations and the ―plausibility of a more cosmopolitan and less 
state-centered perspective‖). 
 54. See id. at 55 (―It is the rights and interests of persons that are of fun-
damental importance from the moral point of view, and it is to these consider-
ations that the justification of principles for international relations should ap-
peal.‖); TERRY NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES 274 
(1983) (―The essential element of cosmopolitan justice in the circumstances of 
the states system is the idea of an international minimum standard to be ob-
served by states in their treatment of individuals, regardless of whether these 
are their own nationals or those of another country.‖). 
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ments as the locus of cosmopolitan moral obligations.55 Even if 
individuals fail in their moral obligations, states can help indi-
viduals realize their obligations.56 In addition, states have 
unique responsibilities of their own apart from people who 
make up the state.57 In this cosmopolitan view, the state is, or 
at least has the capacity to be, a moral agent.58  
Constructivism, institutionalism, and cosmopolitanism re-
tain the unitary state model, but all reject to varying degrees 
the realist view of what does and should affect state behavior. 
Conceptualizing state behavior as socially constructed, institu-
 
 55. See Jack Goldsmith, Liberal Democracy and Cosmopolitan Duty, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 1667, 1670 (2003) (describing the development of an institution-
al turn in cosmopolitan theory). 
 56. See, e.g., Henry Shue, Mediating Duties, 98 ETHICS 687, 697–98 (1988) 
(arguing that institutions, including states, enable individuals to meet global 
responsibilities at lower a cost). 
 57. Michael J. Green argues that institutional agents are ―different kinds 
of agents than individuals are‖ and that ―there is a distinctive set of institu-
tional responsibilities that are structurally different from individual responsi-
bilities.‖ Michael J. Green, Institutional Responsibility for Global Problems, 30 
PHIL. TOPICS 79, 86–88 (2002). These responsibilities may include dealing 
with ―global problems.‖ Id. at 89.  
  Part of the reason for the institutional move is to allow the state to 
overcome limitations on individual morality. See, e.g., Charles R. Beitz, Cos-
mopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment, 80 J. PHIL. 591, 599 (1983) (―[A] 
state may demand more of its people than its people, as individuals, must de-
mand of themselves when cosmopolitan goals require sacrifices of them.‖); 
Green, supra, at 90. The basic idea is that where individuals may be limited 
by self-interest and lack of capacity to tackle social or global problems, states 
have the ability and responsibility to address such problems. See IRIS MARION 
YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 250 (2000) (―Obligations of social justice 
are not primarily owed by individuals to individuals. Instead, they concern 
primarily the organization of institutions.‖).  
 58. This cosmopolitan view is not just academic. In its strongest form, 
doctrines such as responsibility to protect (R2P) posit the duty of states to pro-
tect people in other states from genocide, ethnic cleansing and the like, by mil-
itary means if necessary, even when such efforts have little to do with the 
state‘s self-interest. See, e.g., INT‘L COMM‘N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVE-
REIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT ¶ 1.35 (Dec. 2001), available at 
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf (stating that sovereign-
ty implies responsibility to one‘s citizens). The doctrine of R2P means that 
states have responsibilities to protect their own citizens and people and also 
have a responsibility to people in other states. See Carla Bagnoli, Humanita-
rian Intervention as a Perfect Duty: A Kantian Argument, in HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION, NOMOS XLVII 117, 130 (Terry Nardin & Melissa S. Williams 
eds., 2006) (―It follows from it that neutrality is morally inadmissible, that the 
decision not to intervene calls for blame and other moral sanctions. The per-
fect duty to coerce the offender is complementary to the perfect duty to protect 
the victim.‖); Neomi Rao, The Unbearable Lightness of Responsibility to Protect 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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tional, or moral creates a potentially important role for interna-
tional law. 
3. Limits of Unitary Actor Theories  
Despite their serious disagreements about the nature of 
the state and how it should respond to international law, unita-
ry-actor theories start from the same foundational assumption 
about the state as a single institution. Modeling the state as a 
unitary actor in international law leads theorists to two impor-
tant conclusions. 
First, the state should be treated as if it were a unitary ac-
tor in international relations—a black box undifferentiated by 
its internal processes. These theories do not deny that domestic 
processes might affect state decisions and even in some in-
stances determine state decisions, but nonetheless, they use a 
simplifying assumption that sub-state actors are ultimately 
less important than the ―state‖ for making predictions about in-
ternational behavior. 
Second, as a unitary actor, the state can formulate its in-
terests in a coherent manner. It allows the attribution of vari-
ous interests and goals to the state, rather than to the messy 
collectivity of individuals and institutions that comprise the 
state. This may be the greatest attraction of the unitary-actor 
assumption—states can behave in predictable ways because 
they are, for all relevant purposes, a single institution in the 
sphere of international law.  
Yet unitary theories leave largely unanswered the ques-
tions about how states formulate their interests.59 The public 
choice analysis highlights some of the limitations of unitary 
state theories by demonstrating the pervasive disaggregation of 
interests and incentives within the executive branch, the 
branch most likely to control state action in a unitary manner. 
Public choice may also be complementary to some unitary theo-
ries, particularly rational choice theories, because it provides 
information about the domestic processes that generate state 
interests and shape the form of international law compliance.60 
 
 59. See infra Part IV.A. 
 60. See infra Part IV.A; see also GUZMAN, supra note 35, at 21 (explaining 
how liberal approaches that are similar to public-choice analysis can be recon-
ciled with rational choice approach because ―[o]nce the domestic political 
process plays itself out, however, the state may pursue those policy goals on 
the international stage in a rational and unitary way. From this perspective, 
the liberal model serves as an input for the institutionalist model‖). 
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B. LIBERAL APPROACHES: DISAGGREGATING THE STATE 
In recent years, scholars have challenged the model of uni-
tary states acting within the international system and proposed 
instead a liberal account of international relations that disag-
gregates the state. This work has looked inside the ―black box‖ 
of the unitary state and considered how domestic processes, 
pressures, interests, and institutions affect foreign policy. ―Lib-
eral theory rests on a ‗bottom-up‘ view of politics in which the 
demands of individuals and societal groups are treated as ana-
lytically prior to politics.‖61 State preferences represent subsets 
of domestic society and powerful interest groups, and the confi-
guration of state preferences determines state behavior in in-
ternational relations.62 
In international law, liberal scholars have focused on 
transnational cooperation and non-state actors working togeth-
er. For example, Anne-Marie Slaughter explains that the na-
tion-state ―is disaggregating into its separate, functionally dis-
tinct parts.‖63 In this view, the traditional model of the unitary 
state in international law does not explain the activity at the 
ground level, where many different actors, both in government 
and outside of it, effectively pursue foreign policy. Slaughter 
calls into question the idea of the unitary state and notes that 
this ―fiction of a unitary will and capacity for action‖ blinds us 
from seeing the international system as it really is.64  
Contrary to the dominant unitary perspective, Slaughter 
argues, international regulation across borders occurs through 
a ―disaggregated state‖ of many semi-autonomous institutions 
that have the power and authority to fulfill their mandates and 
interact with similar institutions in other countries.65 Govern-
 
 61. Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of 
International Politics, 51 INT‘L ORG. 513, 517 (1997); see also Robert D. Put-
nam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 
INT‘L ORG. 427, 433–35 (1988) (modeling international relations as a two-level 
game in which international negotiations take place on both the international 
and domestic levels, and to succeed negotiators have to find a winning solution 
to both games simultaneously). 
 62. Moravcsik, supra note 61, at 519–20. 
 63. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 
183, 184 (1997) (―These parts—courts, regulatory agencies, executives, and 
even legislatures—are networking with their counterparts abroad, creating a 
dense web of relations that constitutes a new, transgovernmental order.‖). 
 64. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 12–13 (2004). 
 65. Id.; see also Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle? Reconciling So-
vereignty and Global Governance Through Global Government Networks, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1285 (2005) (reviewing ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW 
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ment officials regularly form networks with their counterparts 
in other countries to develop transgovernmental policy.66 Kal 
Raustiala has identified detailed case studies of the transgov-
ernmental networks at work in regulatory areas such as securi-
ties, antitrust, and the environment.67 Importantly, Slaughter 
posits that transnational networks can improve compliance 
with international law.68  
Focused more specifically on international law compliance, 
Harold Koh recognizes a similar phenomenon in his work on 
the ―transnational legal process,‖ which describes ―how public 
and private actors . . . interact in a variety of public and pri-
vate, domestic and international fora to make, interpret, en-
force, and ultimately, internalize rules of transnational law.‖69 
He offers this process as a theory about why nations comply 
with international law most of the time.70 He argues that na-
tions do so because through a ―repeated cycle of interaction, in-
terpretation, and internalization—the transnational legal 
process—international law acquires its ‗stickiness,‘ and nations 
come to ‗obey‘ out of a perceived self-interest that becomes in-
stitutional habit.‖71 This transnational legal process similarly 
focuses on a disaggregated state. It highlights a complicated 
 
WORLD ORDER (2004)) (noting that a significant assumption behind Slaugh-
ter‘s work is that disaggregated actors have the legal power and authority to 
enter into cross-border relations and that this power also provides evidence for 
the existence of a disaggregated state). 
 66. Slaughter, supra note 63, at 189–90 (―Bureaucrats charged with the 
administration of antitrust policy, securities regulation, environmental policy, 
criminal law enforcement, banking and insurance supervision—in short, all 
the agents of the modern regulatory state—regularly collaborate with their 
foreign counterparts.‖). 
 67. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: 
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. 
INT‘L L. 1, 26–49 (2002) (discussing networks in securities regulation, compe-
tition policy, and environmental regulations). 
 68. Id. at 7 (explaining that national governments would exercise ―their 
national authority to implement their transgovernmental and international 
obligations and represent[] the interests of their country while working with 
their foreign and supranational counterparts to disseminate and distill infor-
mation, cooperate in enforcing national and international laws, harmonizing 
national laws and regulations, and addressing common problems‖). 
 69. Harold Hongju Koh, The 1994 Roscoe Pound Lecture: Transnational 
Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 183–84 (1996). 
 70. Id. at 206 (―[A] theory of transnational legal process has . . . explana-
tory power regarding questions of causation. It predicts that nations will come 
into compliance with international norms . . . .‖). 
 71. Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International 
Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 655 (1998). 
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array of governmental and non-governmental actors working 
together across borders to create and to ensure compliance with 
international law.72  
For Koh, nations follow legal norms because ―domestic de-
cision-making becomes ‗enmeshed‘ with international legal 
norms, as institutional arrangements for the making and main-
tenance of an international commitment become entrenched in 
domestic legal and political processes.‖73 Koh does not, howev-
er, provide a detailed mechanism for how such entrenchment 
occurs, but rather proposes it as a theory of the way govern-
ment actors behave.74  
Even more than Slaughter, Koh stresses the normativity of 
his arguments. Koh argues that the transnational legal process 
promotes obedience to, or compliance with, international law or 
international law norms, which he assumes is a positive good.75 
Koh‘s theory stresses the ability of both sub-state and private 
actors to influence government action in the direction of com-
pliance with international law.76 Thus, the disaggregated state 
is normatively desirable to the extent that it promotes com-
pliance with international law.  
From the description of domestic and transnational coop-
eration, that is non-state activity, however, Slaughter and Koh 
have drawn conclusions about state behavior—namely that 
there will be greater compliance with international law and de-
velopment of more precise norms of international law.77 
Slaughter and Koh focus on how disaggregated actors work 
 
 72. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 69, at 207 (noting that nongovernmental or-
ganizations ―are not just observers of, but important players in, transnational 
legal process‖). 
 73. Id. at 204. 
 74. See Eric A. Posner, International Law and the Disaggregated State, 32 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 797, 801 (2005) (criticizing the work of Koh and Slaughter 
because ―one cannot derive from their discussions any clear predictions about 
how and when nonstate actors cause compliance with international law or 
generate other forms of international cooperation‖). 
 75. Koh, supra note 69, at 204–05 (explaining that the ―critical idea is the 
normativity of transnational legal process‖ in that ―[t]o survive in an interde-
pendent world [all nations] . . . must eventually interact with other nations‖ 
and accordingly internalize international legal norms). 
 76. Id. at 207. 
 77. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 64, at 213 (―Government networks also 
strengthen compliance with international rules and norms, both through ver-
tical enforcement and information networks and by building governance ca-
pacity in countries that have the will but not the means to comply.‖); see also id. 
at 214–15 (noting that government networks ―can harness the coercive power of 
national government officials‖ in addition to other forms of ―soft power‖). 
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transnationally and conclude that this fosters international co-
operation and soft forms of international law.78 They posit that 
liberal approaches demonstrate the relevance of international 
law and predict an increase in state compliance with interna-
tional law.79 This prediction, however, does not follow necessar-
ily from the increase in non-state activities—at least it is not 
clear how the proliferation of non-state international coopera-
tion and dialogue will improve the creation of, and compliance, 
with international law by states.  
C. BRINGING TOGETHER THE ―THEY‖ AND THE ―IT‖ 
Unitary theories recognize that domestic factors may influ-
ence state behavior, yet generally exclude these factors from 
their theories. Similarly, liberal approaches focused on domes-
tic actors minimize or fail to take account of institutions that 
formulate the state‘s view. Liberal theorists acknowledge that 
the state often acts in a unitary manner, but do not provide an 
account of how domestic factors affect the behavior of a state 
qua state. 
By contrast, public choice considers how the ―they‖ of the 
executive branch seeks to function as an ―it‖ with regard to in-
ternational law. In doing so, it follows suggestions in the politi-
cal science literature that unitary and domestic approaches can 
be complementary. For example, Andrew Moravcsik, a propo-
nent of liberalism in international relations, has suggested that 
liberal theories can provide the first step in a two-stage process 
of explaining state behavior. First, liberal theories can help ex-
plain how states define their preferences; and second, state in-
teractions on the international level may be explained by real-
ist and institutionalist theories of strategic interaction.80 
Similarly, Helen V. Milner has modeled the preferences of do-
mestic agents and how they are brought together institutional-
ly in order to systematically study the domestic influences on 
international politics.81  
 
 78. Id. at 261 (―[G]overnment networks promote convergence, compliance 
with international agreements, and improved cooperation among nations on a 
wide range of regulatory and judicial issues.‖). 
 79. Id. (―A world order self-consciously created out of horizontal and ver-
tical government networks could go much further. It could create a genuine 
global rule of law . . . .‖). 
 80. Moravcsik, supra note 61, at 544. 
 81. See HELEN V. MILNER, INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND INFORMATION: 
DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 97, 234 (1997) (―Three 
internal factors condition a state‘s ability to cooperate: the structure of domes-
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This Article proposes a similar two-step process to explain 
aspects of international law compliance within the executive 
branch. Like liberal theories, the public choice analysis of in-
ternational law compliance focuses on variation in domestic 
politics—specifically the preferences and interests of key actors 
and agencies who interpret international law and make deci-
sions about compliance within the executive branch. Yet, like 
state-centered theories, public choice examines the available 
institutional mechanisms within the executive branch for coor-
dination of interests.  
D. THE CENTRALITY OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
This Article considers behavior of officials in the executive 
branch because of the central role that the President plays with 
respect to the interpretation of and compliance with interna-
tional law. As seen above, many theories of international law 
compliance focus either explicitly or implicitly on the activities 
of the executive. Unitary-state theories find their best case for 
unitary action in the executive.82 Liberal theories focus on a 
wide array of government and nongovernment actors, but many 
of the transnational activities they describe relate to the work 
of executive branch agencies, precisely because they are most 
likely to engage their foreign counterparts.  
With international law, as with foreign affairs more gener-
ally, the President has a natural advantage in serving as the 
point of national unity. Speaking with ―one voice‖ on interna-
tional matters is often advanced as an essential component of 
strengthening state power, because it does not display indeci-
sion, internal division, or weakness to other nations.83 More-
over, as a practical matter, analyzing the executive branch al-
lows for study over a more manageable part of the federal 
 
tic preferences, the nature of domestic political institutions, and the distribu-
tion of information internally. . . . [T]hese aspects of the domestic game com-
bined with the international game determine whether cooperation is possible 
and what its terms will be.‖). 
 82. Those who adopt a unitary theory recognize the different components 
of the government, but nonetheless treat it as a unitary entity for the purposes 
of modeling its behavior with regard to international law and foreign affairs. 
See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 13, at 6 (discussing their assump-
tion that state interests are pegged to the state‘s political leadership); infra 
notes 265–75 and accompanying text.  
 83. The Founders recognized the need for a central authority in the realm 
of foreign affairs. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 213 (James Madison) 
(Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (―If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly 
ought to be in respect to other nations.‖). 
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government. Even in the most unitary branch, we can see the 
divergence of agency interests and the difficulty of institutional 
coordination. Public choice problems only multiply when consi-
dering the role of Congress, the Supreme Court, and private  
actors. 
Focus on the executive branch in this Article, however, 
should not be taken to undermine the importance of all three 
branches to foreign policy and international law interpretation. 
Despite the interest in projecting a unitary face abroad, the 
Constitution divides the foreign affairs power—as it does the 
domestic powers—between the three branches.84 This separa-
tion is often overlooked or minimized in the context of interna-
tional policy.85 Congress and the Supreme Court have impor-
tant constitutional roles with respect to international law.86 
 
 84. See MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION‘S TEXT IN FOREIGN AF-
FAIRS 8 (2007) (arguing that the interest in speaking with ―one voice‖ is a poli-
cy preference and one that is ―fundamentally opposed to the constitutional de-
sign‖). See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to 
Interpret International Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1762 passim (2009) (providing a 
thorough treatment of the textual and historical understanding of the consti-
tutional powers of the three branches in foreign affairs). 
 85. RAMSEY, supra note 84, at 379–80 (explaining that his textual account 
of the Constitution‘s text in foreign affairs closely resembles the ―standard de-
scription of constitutional government in domestic affairs‖); see also SLAUGH-
TER, supra note 64, at 13 (noting that in domestic affairs ―[w]e do not choose to 
screen out everything except what the president does or says, or what Con-
gress does or says, or what the Supreme Court does or says. But effectively, in 
the international system, we do‖). 
 86. The Constitution gives Congress authority to define and punish ―Of-
fences against the Law of Nations.‖ U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. This power 
gives Congress a significant role in formulating customary international law. 
See Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress’s Power to “De-
fine and Punish . . . Offenses Against the Law of Nations”, 42 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 447, 452 (2000) (―An analysis of the Clause supports the conclusion that 
the framers delegated extraordinary foreign affairs powers to Congress, far 
broader than those granted on the domestic front.‖); see also Paulsen, supra 
note 84, at 1809 (―Given international law‘s fogginess and (in part) common 
law nature, Congress possesses in effect a common-law-making power to pass 
criminal laws concerning matters it decides are a violation of the Law of Na-
tions.‖). Congress also participates in the formation of international agree-
ments, including treaties requiring the support of two-thirds of the Senate, 
and may enact statutes to implement treaty obligations. See Peter J. Spiro, 
Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEX. L. REV. 
961, 962 (2001) (discussing the difference between treaties and executive 
agreements). 
  Along with the political branches, the judiciary interprets and ensures 
compliance with international law as an ordinary incidence of its duty to de-
cide cases and controversies. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Paulsen, supra 
note 84, at 1816–17 (2009) (explaining that international law may be invoked 
in U.S. courts just as domestic law and there is no ―‗foreign affairs exception‘ 
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Precisely what the allocation of constitutional powers is with 
regard to foreign affairs has been the subject of much dispute, 
and the branches may conflict in the pursuit of their aims.87 
For the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to highlight that 
the U.S. Constitution provides for separation of powers over 
foreign affairs, including the mechanisms for interpreting and 
complying with international law.  
Nonetheless, over time the President has consolidated 
power over foreign policy. With regard to international law, the 
President plays a central, though not exclusive, role in its for-
mation, interpretation, and compliance. The Constitution gives 
the President authority to represent the United States in its in-
teractions with other nations and to create international law by 
negotiating treaties and other agreements with foreign pow-
ers.88 As Commander-in-Chief of the nation‘s military, the Pres-
ident leads the conduct of war, which provides a significant 
source of authority to interpret the obligations of the law of 
war.89 Many have argued that executive power has been at its 
height since the attacks of September 11, 2001.  
 
to the power of American courts to decide questions of international law or of 
U.S. law that draw upon norms of international law‖). Although the Court has 
sometimes deferred to the political branches in foreign affairs, see, e.g., United 
States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318–19 (1936) (discussing 
the broad power of the President over foreign affairs), it has often directly en-
gaged in deciding difficult issues regarding the domestic effects of internation-
al law, see Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 526–27 (2008) (holding, in one part 
of the opinion, that certain non-self-executing treaties do not give the Presi-
dent the power to make them self-executing). 
 87. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–
1957 (4th ed. 1957) (―[T]he Constitution . . . is an invitation to struggle for the 
privilege of direct[ing] American foreign policy.‖); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 25 (2d ed. 1996) (―Whether 
one finds the mantle of national authority over foreign relations buried in the 
Constitution or more or less outside it, separation and checks and balances 
govern the conduct of foreign affairs also, but here they look different, have 
different consequences, raise different issues.‖); RAMSEY, supra note 84, at 8 
(―The Constitution deliberately fosters multiple voices in foreign affairs, as it 
fosters multiple voices in domestic affairs.‖). 
 88. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Article II also gives the President the 
power to ―appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls.‖ Id. The 
President ―shall receive Ambassadors and other public ministers.‖ Id. at art. 2, 
§ 3. These explicit grants of power have often been interpreted to give the 
President the power to recognize governments, modify relationships with gov-
ernments, and determine the contents of communications with foreign gov-
ernments. See HENKIN, supra note 87, at 36–38 (discussing the foreign affairs 
powers of the President). 
 89. HENKIN, supra note 87, at 45–50 (describing the President‘s powers as 
Commander-in-Chief ). 
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Questions about the scope and applicability of internation-
al law arise during the course of all manners of executive 
branch activities including trade, financial regulation, and en-
vironmental policy. Lawyers within the various agencies must 
determine the applicability of international law. In the process 
of executing domestic laws, the President must decide to what 
extent and in what manner international law affects how he 
proceeds with his work.90 Such on-the-ground determinations 
will largely be confined to the executive branch and most of 
these questions will never be reviewed in court.91 
Moreover, even after determining that international law 
applies to a contemplated action, the President may have, in 
certain circumstances, the authority to disregard international 
law.92 This may include the unilateral authority to terminate 
treaties.93 To varying degrees, it is thought that the President 
 
 90. See Paulsen, supra note 84, at 1812 (―If the Constitution‘s grant of ‗the 
executive power‘ is rightly understood as embracing the power to determine 
and direct the content of the United States‘ policies with respect to relations 
with other nations, this is truly an enormous sphere of constitutional power 
within which the President possesses authority to interpret the obligations of 
international law for the United States.‖); see also Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 
F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of reh‘g en 
banc) (explaining that ―international-law norms are not domestic U.S. law in the 
absence of action by the political branches to codify those norms‖ and ―[t]o the 
extent there is ambiguity in a statutory grant to the President of war-making 
authority, the President . . . is to resolve the ambiguity in the first instance‖). 
 91. Questions about the scope of executive branch behavior may stay out 
of the court for any number of reasons, including secrecy of some actions, the 
difficulty of finding an appropriate plaintiff with standing, and the possibility 
that courts will decline to review ―political‖ questions. See, e.g., Al-Aulaqi v. 
Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 47 (D.D.C. 2010) (determining the political ques-
tion doctrine barred judicial consideration of an injunction prohibiting the tar-
geted killing of Anwar Al-Aulaqi in part because ―there are no judicially man-
ageable standards by which courts can endeavor to assess the President‘s 
interpretation of military intelligence and his resulting decision based on that 
intelligence—whether to use military force against a terrorist target overseas‖).  
 92. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNIT-
ED STATES § 115 reporters‘ note 3 (1987) (―[T]he President has the power, 
when acting within his constitutional authority, to disregard a rule of interna-
tional law or an agreement of the United States . . . .‖); cf. Michael J. Glennon, 
Raising The Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary International Law by 
the Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 321, 325 (1985) (arguing 
that ―[w]hen Congress approves of a presidential act violative of a customary 
international law, that act is constitutionally permissible‖). 
 93. See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 699, 708–09 (D.C. Cir. 1979) 
(en banc), vacated on other grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); see also Paulsen, su-
pra note 84, at 1778 (explaining that if the President‘s ―executive power in-
cludes the power over foreign affairs . . . , a treaty may not extinguish or limit 
such constitutional power‖ (footnote omitted)). 
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may disregard international law when it conflicts with consti-
tutional requirements.94 The extent to which the President may 
disregard international law in a particular circumstance, how-
ever, will depend on legal analysis, but also on security, mili-
tary, diplomatic, and political considerations.95 In sum, the 
President‘s grant of executive power gives him significant, 
though by no means exclusive, authority to determine the ex-
tent and manner of United States compliance with internation-
al law. 
E. THE ―SOFTNESS‖ OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Before turning to the public choice of international law 
compliance, it is important to take into account some particular 
characteristics of international law. Compliance with interna-
tional law is complicated because (1) there are different levels 
of domestic obligation associated with various forms of interna-
tional law; and (2) international law has varying degrees of 
―softness‖ that invite policy judgments and allow a wide range 
of plausible interpretations. 
At the outset, there are different types of international law 
that have different domestic effects in the United States. There 
is widespread agreement that statutes incorporating interna-
tional law and self-executing treaties can be enforced domesti-
cally.96 The President interprets treaty obligations in the first 
instance and courts generally defer to executive interpretation 
when treaties are ambiguous.97 
 
 94. See generally HENKIN, supra note 87, at 241–45 (explaining that the 
President ―has independent constitutional authority in foreign affairs as Ex-
ecutive, as treaty-maker, as ‗sole organ,‘ and as Commander in Chief. Under 
these powers, the President can act in ways that make or affect law in the 
United States, and it may be that as far as the Constitution is concerned he 
can exercise these powers even in ways that are inconsistent with U.S. inter-
national obligations‖); Paulsen, supra note 84, at 1812–16 (―[T]he President 
has the largely discretionary power to adopt, interpret, and apply principles of 
internal law, as he thinks most proper, as an aspect of the Article II ‗executive 
Power‘ with respect to foreign affairs and as an aspect of his power as the mili-
tary‘s Commander in Chief.‖). 
 95. Jack Goldsmith has observed that the President ―could in theory re-
verse any OLC decision and set legal policy for the executive branch.‖ 
GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 79.  
 96. See generally Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–05 (2008); John F. 
Coyle, Incorporative Statutes and the Borrowed Treaty Rule, 50 VA. J. INT‘L L. 
655 (2010). 
 97. See David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 
41 UCLA L. REV. 953, 960–63 (1994); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Che-
vronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1211–12 (2007) (arguing 
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Other forms of international law, such as non-self-
executing treaties or customary international law, have inter-
national effect, but their domestic effect remains in dispute. 
There is a robust and ongoing debate about what is legitimately 
included within this area of law and whether and to what de-
gree it is binding on the President.98 Some maintain that cus-
tomary international law is part of federal general common 
law, enforceable by U.S. courts, but this position has been se-
riously contested in recent years.99 As far as the executive 
branch is concerned, such law is not binding,100 although it may 
deserve respect and the President may use such law when mak-
ing decisions relating to foreign affairs and military prepared-
ness. Customary international law poses particular problems of 
interpretation, especially as it has expanded away from tradi-
tional forms and toward new categories not firmly rooted in ac-
tual state practice.101  
In addition to questions about enforceability, international 
law exhibits varying degrees of ―softness‖ and differs with re-
spect to its precision, obligation, and enforcement.102 More pre-
cise terms, more binding agreements, or better mechanisms for 
enforcement produce greater legalization or hardness in inter-
national law. Theorists have explained that international law 
rarely exhibits significant hardness—instead states routinely 
choose forms of legalization that are soft as to precision, obliga-
 
that ―self-executing treaties and statutes incorporating international law 
should be subject to executive interpretation to the extent that they are ambi-
guous and the executive‘s interpretation is reasonable‖ and that judicial defe-
rence has ―significant advantages‖ over allowing courts to interpret ambiguous 
treaties). 
 98. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary Interna-
tional Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 815, 844–46 (1997); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense 
About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and 
Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997). The debate continues in the fed-
eral judiciary as well, as is evident in such decisions as Al-Bihani v. Obama in 
which Judges Brown, Kavanaugh, and Williams exchanged lengthy opinions 
over the appropriate use of international law norms for the interpretation of 
statutes by the judiciary. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (de-
nying reh‘g en banc). 
 99. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 98. 
 100. See, e.g., Auth. of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation to Override Int‘l 
Law in Extraterritorial Law Enforcement, 13 Op. O.L.C. 163, 168–70 (1989). 
 101. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 98, at 839–40. 
 102. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in In-
ternational Governance, 54 INT‘L ORG. 421, 421–24 (2000). 
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tion, and/or enforcement.103 Thus, although one might see pre-
cise terms, they will often be coupled with low levels of enfor-
ceability; or, alternatively, an agreement may have open-ended 
terms, subject to wide-ranging interpretation, but have rela-
tively strict enforcement mechanisms.104 Similarly, domestic 
statutes pertaining to the conduct of foreign affairs may also be 
manipulated through interpretations, such as Harold Koh‘s de-
finition of ―hostilities‖ under the War Powers Resolution to not 
include drone attacks, aerial piloted attacks, and other military 
efforts.105 Moreover, although some traditional rules and doc-
trines of international law may be well-established, newer 
norms of international law may be less determinate, particular-
ly as applied to new circumstances such as the war on terror 
and the evolving technologies for fighting it. The variability 
and softness of international law encourages interpretations 
that combine law with political judgment, making it difficult to 
separate the two.106 
This short discussion highlights the well-accepted under-
standing that assessments of international law depend, often to 
a significant degree, not only on formal legal interpretation, but 
on practical considerations about the effects on foreign and do-
mestic policy.107 Regardless of whether ―harder‖ international 
law is desirable, lawyers and officials within the executive 
branch treat international law compliance along a continuum 
that considers a combination of legal, political, diplomatic, and 
national security concerns. In addition, since international law 
interpretation is often less settled by courts, the political 
branches retain more leeway. The available legitimate or plaus-
 
 103. See id. at 455–56. 
 104. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-
Marie Slaughter & Duncan Snidal, The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT‘L ORG. 
401, 404–08 (2000). 
 105. See Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Foreign Relations 
Comm., 112th Cong. (June 28, 2011) (written testimony of Harold Hongju Koh, 
Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep‘t of State), http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Koh_ 
Testimony.pdf (explaining that ―hostilities‖ is an ―ambiguous standard‖ that 
does not apply to the armed conflict in Libya); Savage, supra note 8. 
 106. See Abbott et al., supra note 104, at 419 (―Law and politics are intert-
wined at all levels of legalization . . . . [ I]t is reasonable to assume that most of 
the time, legal and political considerations combine to influence behavior.‖). 
 107. A number of former State Department legal advisers ―acknowledged 
that where international law is unsettled or legitimately open to differing in-
terpretations, they would naturally favor the interpretation most consonant 
with the course of action advocated by policy-makers.‖ SCHARF & WILLIAMS, 
supra note 11, at 205.  
 2011] PUBLIC CHOICE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 223 
 
ible interpretations allow for a range of policies that might be 
compliant with international law. 
II.  PUBLIC CHOICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
COMPLIANCE   
This Part will explain what I call the public choice of inter-
national law compliance. By this I mean describing and eva-
luating how officials and agencies within the executive branch 
interpret international law and make decisions about com-
pliance. The emphasis here is on key domestic processes that 
determine compliance with international law. Pulling apart the 
interests, incentives, preferences, and approaches of different 
agencies and entities reveals an executive often at odds with 
itself. The public choice analysis demonstrates how the execu-
tive branch is a ―they‖ and not an ―it‖ even with regard to for-
eign affairs and international law compliance.108 
Bureaucratic competition and the difficulty of presidential 
control have been examined in the domestic context109 and also 
with respect to international relations,110 but nonetheless these 
observations play surprisingly little role in how theorists eva-
luate state compliance with international law. The public 
choice analysis applies these tools to the agencies responsible 
for questions of international law compliance. Foreign policy 
emerges out of a process that involves many different agencies 
and individuals who act in part based on their particular inter-
ests, concerns, and agendas, and often will have divergent or 
conflicting interests and preferences with regard to how the 
state pursues foreign policy within the framework of interna-
tional law.111 These actors work out their differences in a man-
 
 108. See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 49 n.5 (citing sources 
where this observation has been made in the context of the administrative 
state and also for Congress); see also Putnam, supra note 61, at 432 (―If the 
term ‗state‘ is to be used to mean ‗central decision-makers,‘ we should treat it 
as a plural noun: not ‗the state, it . . . ‘ but ‗the state, they . . . .‘‖). 
 109. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 257–76 (1st ed. 1989). 
 110. See GRAHAM ALLISON & PHILIP ZELIKOW, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EX-
PLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 143–98, 255–93 (2d ed. 1999). 
 111. The political science literature offers further insight into the question 
of how domestic politics influences foreign policy and international relations, 
although this literature is not particularly concerned with international law 
compliance. See, e.g., ALLISON & ZELIKOW, supra note 110, at 113; Putnam, 
supra note 61, at 460 (―Unlike state-centric theories, the two-level approach 
recognizes the inevitability of domestic conflict about what the ‗national inter-
est‘ requires.‖); Steven B. Redd, The Influence of Advisers and Decision Strate-
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ner that is often ill-defined and haphazard. Even when the 
state must act in a centralized manner, key decision makers 
frequently divide over what action to take. The resolution of 
differences in this process does not necessarily proceed in a li-
near or coordinated manner. 
Thus, the public choice analysis of executive branch action 
fills a critical gap between unitary state theories and explana-
tions of the state as disaggregated in international law. Like 
disaggregated theories, the public choice account looks inside 
the ―black box‖ to study various actors. Like unitary theories, it 
also looks at institutional mechanisms for coordinating agency 
interests in the formation of ―state‖ interests. 
This Part first provides a brief overview of some of the ba-
sic tenets of public choice theory, including some applications of 
these insights to international law. Then I examine interna-
tional law compliance in the executive branch of the United 
States through a public choice framework by describing the key 
legal offices that determine the interpretation and scope of in-
ternational law. For each agency, I examine and explain its op-
erating structure; its culture, including the agency‘s self-image 
as well as its external image; its incentives with regard to in-
ternational law interpretation and compliance; and finally its 
relationship to the White House and President. This account 
provides a richer description of how the executive branch de-
termines whether and how to comply with international law 
and considers some of the dynamics that shape decision making 
and the attempts to coordinate divergent viewpoints.  
A. AN OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY 
Public choice theory provides a richer understanding of col-
lective action within the government, examining in greater de-
tail the incentives and operations of legislatures and bureau-
crats with regard to domestic policy and regulation. Public 
 
gies on Foreign Policy Choices: President Clinton’s Decision to Use Force in Ko-
sovo, 6 INT‘L STUD. PERSP. 129, 145 (2005) (―The broad policy implication of 
this theory and these case study and empirical studies is that leaders will of-
ten be constrained by domestic/political considerations above all else.‖). 
[ I ]ndividual decision makers vary in their subjective estimations of 
costs and benefits, even when faced with the same information. One 
cannot conclude therefore, that regardless of who had been sitting in 
the White House, he or she would have also decided to use force given 
identical military, economic, and political conditions. 
Alex Mintz, The Decision to Attack Iraq: A Noncompensatory Theory of Deci-
sion Making, 37 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 595, 614 (1993) (citations omitted).  
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choice starts from an assumption that collective entities do not 
make decisions, but instead are comprised of individuals who 
make decisions based on advancing their rational interests.112 
Broadly speaking, public choice analysis focuses on political 
dynamics in order to try to explain the outcomes of the political 
or bureaucratic process.113 
In studying these dynamics, public choice theory looks at 
the incentives and preferences of individuals within an organi-
zation in order to understand how the institution works. ―Pub-
lic choice helps to illuminate the ways in which specific institu-
tional actors—flesh-and-blood legislators, judges, and 
bureaucrats—interact, and how differing institutions operate 
individually and in combination.‖114 ―Public choice‖ refers to a 
number of different theories and concepts often given this la-
bel.115 The analysis focuses on compromises that must be made 
between competing political interests.116 
 
 112. MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS 
AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW 7–10 (2009) (discussing the assumption of individ-
ual rationality); Ronald A. Cass, Introduction: Economics and International 
Law, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: COMPARATIVE AND 
EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 36 (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Alan O. Sykes eds., 
1997).  
 113. For a more detailed discussion of public choice concepts and their ap-
plications, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC 
CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, 
AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997); 
STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 112. 
 114. STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 112. 
 115. For example, one branch focuses on interest-group theory and de-
scribes the political process as a competition between self-interested individu-
als and groups, including politicians and special interests. In this view, legis-
lation and regulation generally result from powerful interest groups using 
politicians and the political process to improve their welfare, rather than the 
general welfare of the public. ―In short, legislation is ‗sold‘ by the legislature 
and ‗bought‘ by the beneficiaries of the legislation.‖ William M. Landes & Ri-
chard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 
18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975); see also FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 113, 
at 12–37; George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. 
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).  
  Another related branch, sometimes called social choice, studies the 
democratic process and suggests not just that it might be a product of special 
interests but rather ―that political outcomes will be entirely incoherent and 
that the whole concept of the ‗public interest‘ is meaningless.‖ FARBER & 
FRICKEY, supra note 113, at 38; see also WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM 
AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 
AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 167 (1982) (explaining how the meaning 
of social choices is obscure and may simply be the ―accidental amalgamation of 
what the manipulators (perhaps unintentionally) happened to produce‖). 
 116. See Paul B. Stephan III, Barbarians Inside the Gate: Public Choice 
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Of particular relevance to this Article, scholars have of-
fered competing public choice accounts of bureaucratic beha-
vior.117 For example, William Niskanen set forth a principle of 
agency expansion—that rational bureaucrats seek to maximize 
their budgets and, consequently, their salaries and power.118 By 
contrast, James Q. Wilson posited that agencies tend to be risk 
averse and will behave in a manner that protects their auton-
omy, which includes maintaining independence from oversight 
by other agencies.119 Wilson examined how the culture of an 
agency, including whether it had a strong mission, affects its 
behavior, priorities, and ability to adapt to changing circum-
stances.120 Public choice may not explain the full range of polit-
ical behavior, but it provides a useful tool for pulling apart the 
motivations of individuals who make up government institu-
tions in order to better understand institutional decision mak-
ing.121 
Although currently limited, there has been a growing in-
terest in public choice applications to international law.122 
 
Theory and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT‘L L. & POL‘Y 745, 
748 (1995) (explaining that public choice theory assumes ―politics must consist 
primarily of the effecting of tradeoffs and compromises among competing in-
terests, rather than a solidaristic pursuit of an overarching common goal to 
the exclusion of opposing claims‖). 
 117. STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 112, at 342–55 (providing an over-
view of the various theories of bureaucratic action). 
 118. WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT 38 (1971). 
 119. WILSON, supra note 109, at 90–112. 
 120. James Q. Wilson noted the effects of culture, including that 
[f ]irst, tasks that are not part of the culture will not be attended to 
with the same energy and resources as are devoted to tasks that are 
part of it. Second, organizations in which two or more cultures strug-
gle for supremacy will experience serious conflict as defenders of one 
seek to dominate representatives of others. Third, organizations will 
resist taking on new tasks that seem incompatible with its dominant 
culture. 
Id. at 101. 
 121. There is disagreement about whether these positive descriptions 
should lead to normative insights about how courts, agencies, and ordinary 
people should view the political process and the outputs of that process, and 
indeed, what those normative insights should be. See, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY, 
supra note 113, at 42–47 (1991); Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of 
Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups 
in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).  
 122. See generally Cass, supra note 112, at 1–4 (describing the potential for 
growth in the field of public choice and international law); D. Daniel Sokol, 
Explaining the Importance of Public Choice for Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1029, 
1041–48 (2011) (reviewing MAXWELL STEARNS & TODD ZYWICKI, PUBLIC 
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Scholars have used public choice theory to explain various as-
pects of international policy. For example, Enrico Colombatto 
and Jonathan R. Macey have explained international insider-
trading regulation from the perspective of regulators who found 
an international regulatory regime in their interest because it 
increased their power and authority.123 Alan O. Sykes and And-
rew T. Guzman have analyzed the domestic political incentives 
that cause agencies to seek greater regulatory control through 
particular international trade regimes.124 Julie Roin has ex-
amined factors accounting for the difficulty of international 
harmonization of tax policy.125 Public choice analysis in these 
areas has focused on specific issues and problems and eva-
luated the domestic political considerations that drive interna-
tional policy and cooperation.126 It takes a hard look at the 
compromises between competing interests, rather than assum-
ing an ideal of compliance with international law.127  
This Part seeks to apply public choice insights to the ques-
tion of how the executive branch in the United States deter-
mines compliance with international law. In international mat-
ters, the President represents the state abroad128 and this 
provides a certain amount of very important unity. Nonethe-
less, even the unitary executive is an aggregation of different 
individuals, institutions, and interests with respect to interna-
tional policy. The public choice of international law compliance 
 
CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW (2009), criticizing the authors 
for their omission of public choice applications to international policy and or-
ganizations and stressing the importance of this topic); Stephan, supra note 
116, at 767. 
 123. Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan R. Macey, A Public Choice Model of 
International Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State, 18 
CARDOZO L. REV. 925, 951–54 (1996). 
 124. SeeAndrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 
883, 906–13 (2002) (explaining that when governments attempt to expand 
their laws extraterritorially it leads to global overregulation); Alan O. Sykes, 
Protectionism as a “Safeguard”: A Positive Analysis of the GATT “Escape 
Clause” with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1991) (discussing 
the public choice perspective as it relates to the escape clause of Article XIX). 
 125. Julie Roin, Taxation with Coordination, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S61 (2002). 
 126. Colombatto & Macey, supra note 123, at 932 (―Public choice theory re-
jects the idea that states have interests, and instead posits that international 
institutions are vehicles through which politicians, bureaucrats, and interest 
groups reflect their own interests.‖). 
 127. See Stephan, supra note 116, at 767 (noting that public choice sug-
gests ―appetites more than ideals might dominate the lawmaking process, a 
conclusion that is at least dreary if not disillusioning‖). 
 128. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2. 
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examines the interests and incentives that several key agencies 
have with regard to the interpretation and compliance with in-
ternational law. 
B. INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERPRETATION IN THE EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH 
This Part identifies several key agencies and actors re-
sponsible for decisions about international law interpretation 
and application throughout the executive branch. It examines 
in greater detail the State Department Legal Adviser, the De-
partment of Defense General Counsel, the Department of Jus-
tice Office of Legal Counsel, and the National Security Legal 
Advisor. Each of these offices, and a number of others not con-
sidered in detail here,129 play an important role in the interpre-
tation of international law and the formation of foreign policy. 
In the case of conflict, however, no agency enjoys a constant su-
premacy over the others. Moreover, each agency has a particu-
lar culture and institutional interests that shape how it pro-
vides legal analysis.130 When advising the President or his close 
advisors, these agencies and individuals may disagree over how 
to interpret and apply international law and thus may compete 
for the attention and trust of the President. This occurs despite 
the fact that the President appoints the heads of these offices 
and retains the ability to remove them from office.  
Examining these agencies in greater detail reveals a dy-
namic of negotiation and competition between them. Each 
agency has a specific function and mandate. Agencies also have 
their own organizational culture, ―a persistent, patterned way 
of thinking about the central tasks of and human relationships 
within an organization.‖131 Some of these agencies and their le-
gal offices will have a stronger sense of ―mission‖ than other of-
fices and this will affect the way in which they make decisions. 
Agencies also have distinct constituencies and interest groups 
that monitor and seek to shape agency positions.  
 
 129. Other legal offices include intelligence agencies, such as the Central 
Intelligence Agency and Department of National Intelligence; litigating divi-
sions of the Department of Justice, including the Solicitor General‘s Office; 
White House lawyers, including the Counsel to the President and the General 
Counsel of the U.S. Trade Representative; and lawyers within other agencies 
specifically focused on international law matters. 
 130. See WILSON, supra note 109, at 86 (explaining how agency beliefs 
shape how an agency performs its tasks). 
 131. Id. at 91. 
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Moreover, the internal dynamics and relationships of each 
office or agency help to identify its interests and incentives 
with regard to international law interpretation.132 These dy-
namics include the relationship between the political appoin-
tees and career lawyers, as well as the type of career legal staff 
generally found in the office, and the dynamics between the le-
gal office and the agency of which it is a part. Finally, each en-
tity will have a particular, and often shifting, relationship to 
the White House and will compete to influence centralized deci-
sion making. This dynamic of competition on key policy matters 
will further affect the manner in which agencies interpret and 
apply international law.  
This public choice analysis also considers institutions 
available for coordination and observes that the executive 
branch has no singular process for deciding whether and in 
what manner to comply with international law. Instead there 
are myriad pathways by which international law considerations 
come to bear on centralized decision making. Moreover, because 
there are so many providers of international law interpretation, 
conflicts over the scope and applicability of international law 
frequently arise and these are not consistently coordinated into 
a singular state interest.133  
This Part provides a more realistic description of how even 
centralized executive branch decision making may depend upon 
diverse sources of legal interpretation and result from an ill-
defined process by which issues of international law are raised 
and addressed.134 These public choice insights suggest that in-
ternational law compliance results, at least in part, from the 
negotiation and competition between different stakeholders in 
the executive branch, rather than from a unitary interest or 
purpose.  
 
 132. The descriptions of agency behavior are based on published accounts 
of former administration officials and other publicly available accounts of how 
these offices work and have handled particular policy issues. Some of this ma-
terial draws from my personal observations as Associate Counsel in the Office 
of the Counsel to the President (the White House Counsel‘s Office), as well as 
from interviews and conversations with former administration officials who 
had responsibility for the interpretation of international law and the forma-
tion of foreign policy. 
 133. See infra Part III. 
 134. One possibility is that such disaggregation is purposeful and serves the 
interests of the President in formulating foreign policy and determining com-
pliance with international law. See infra notes 257–60 and accompanying text. 
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1. State Department Legal Adviser 
The legal adviser‘s office in the State Department  
furnishes advice on all legal issues, domestic and international, aris-
ing in the course of the Department‘s work. This includes assisting 
Department principals and policy officers in formulating and imple-
menting the foreign policies of the United States, and promoting the 
development of international law and its institutions as a fundamen-
tal element of those policies.135 
The office of the legal adviser (frequently referred to as ―L‖) 
primarily provides advice to various offices within the State 
Department, but also may have a broader role in overseeing in-
ternational law related matters in other agencies or the White 
House.136  
The State Department‘s mission and culture emphasize 
diplomacy and relationships with other nations.137 The specific 
culture of the legal adviser‘s office values international law and 
considers it a positive good for the promotion of human rights 
and as a solution to problems of international scope.138 The le-
gal adviser‘s office has a distinct mission with regard to inter-
national law—it works to ensure U.S. compliance with interna-
tional law and seeks to promote international law norms within 
the government and abroad.139  
Moreover, the legal adviser sometimes considers it essen-
tial to engage in international legal diplomacy by promoting 
the efforts of international law and the role of the United 
States as a supporter of international law. As John B. Bellin-
ger, legal adviser during the George W. Bush Administration, 
noted: ―I also wanted to make sure that other countries under-
stood that the United States does take international law se-
 
 135. Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. DEP‘T OF ST., http://www.state.gov/s/l / 
( last visited Oct. 22, 2011). 
 136. SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at xix. 
 137. See Bureau of Resource Management, U.S. DEP‘T OF ST., http://www 
.state.gov/s/d/rm/index.htm#/mission ( last visited Oct. 22, 2011) (―Advance free-
dom for the benefit of the American people and the international community by 
helping to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world 
composed of well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, re-
duce widespread poverty, and act responsibly within the international system.‖). 
 138. See Richard B. Bilder, The Office of the Legal Adviser: The State De-
partment Lawyer and Foreign Affairs, 56 AM. J. INT‘L L. 633, 680 (1962) (ex-
plaining the values and policy interests involved with practicing in the Office 
of the Legal Adviser). 
 139. Id. at 634; see also Office of the Legal Adviser, supra note 135. 
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riously. . . . I considered this aspect of the office‘s work to be a 
central part of my tenure as Legal Adviser.‖140  
The approach of the legal adviser is often referred to in 
terms of ―conscience.‖141 ―L‖ upholds international morals and 
legal obligations for the government at large. Conscience here 
may stem from particular international obligations or simply 
wider cosmopolitan principles—a general outlook that persists 
across administrations. The norms of ―L‖ may differ from other 
agencies also charged with the interpretation of international 
law. In the idealistic or symbolic view, compliance with inter-
national law may be a kind of moral imperative, the right way 
forward for the United States and the world.142  
Davis Robinson, legal adviser during the Reagan Adminis-
tration, noted that his office ―for many years was viewed in the 
government at large as the moral conscience of American for-
eign policy.‖143 Similarly, the current legal adviser, Harold Koh, 
has repeatedly written and spoken about the normative and 
moral dimensions of international law compliance.144 As Koh 
explained in a public lecture, the legal adviser serves not only 
as counselor, but also ―as a conscience for the U.S. Government 
with regard to international law. The Legal Adviser . . . offers 
opinions on both the wisdom and morality of proposed interna-
tional actions.‖145 The staff attorney-advisers similarly adopt a 
perspective of international lawyers who believe in the ―impor-
tance and utility of adherence to international rules and 
 
 140. SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 137.  
 141. Id. at xix. 
 142. See Philip Allott, The International Lawyer in Government Service: 
Ontology and Deontology, 23 WIS. INT‘L L.J. 13, 23 (2005) (―Like a sailor on dry 
land, the ideal international lawyer in government service will have in the 
mind‘s eye a more distant horizon, the wonderful possibility of human social 
progress beyond the dreadful reality of human social evil.‖). 
 143. SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 206 (quoting interview with 
Davis Robinson). 
 144. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 71, at 680–81 (―Nations obey [international 
law] because of people like us—lawyers and citizens who care about interna-
tional law, who choose not to leave the law at the water‘s edge, who do their 
utmost to ‗bring international law home.‘‖). 
 145. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep‘t of State, Remarks to 
the American Society of International Law: The Obama Administration and 
International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/ 
139119.htm. 
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norms‖ and ―tend to favor [policies] that they believe enhance[] 
the stability and coherence of the international legal regime.‖146 
Yet most legal advisers speaking about their role also rec-
ognize the essentially pragmatic nature of their job—to provide 
the best possible legal advice, and if it is not taken, to craft the 
best justifications under international law after the fact.147 The 
legal adviser, like other administration lawyers, interprets in-
ternational law against a backdrop of his department‘s policy 
goals. As Richard Bilder noted in the 1960s, working in the Le-
gal Adviser‘s office caused one to develop a ―pragmatic or func-
tional approach to international law—a tendency to view that 
law less as a body of fixed and unchangeable rules than as a 
flexible tool for use in forging real solutions to practical prob-
lems of international order.‖148  
More recently, Koh has observed that as a government 
lawyer his role is to remove illegal options from consideration, 
but once that is done, his ―client has a right to choose from the 
other options, even those you think are lawful if awful and if 
that‘s the choice they make, you have to give it your vigorous 
defense.‖149 Koh also explained in his Senate testimony about 
the lawfulness of the Libya intervention that reasonable minds 
may disagree about the interpretation of the War Powers Reso-
lution, ―[b]ut that should not distract those of us in government 
from the most urgent question now facing us, which is not one 
of law but of policy.‖150 This pragmatic reality of justifying the 
 
 146. Michael K. Young, The Role of the Attorney-Adviser in the U.S. De-
partment of State: Institutional Arrangements and Structural Imperatives, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1998, at 133, 139–40. 
 147. For example, Michael J. Matheson, former legal adviser under the 
George H.W. Bush Administration, explained, 
when the decision is made to use force, it‘s important what argument 
is made to justify that decision. There are some ways of justifying 
that are more consistent with past practices; the Legal Adviser can 
have a considerable amount of influence on what arguments are 
made, which in turn greatly influences what precedential effect that 
use of force might have. 
SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 165; see also id. at 168 (quoting a for-
mer legal adviser during the Reagan Administration, Davis Robinson, who 
noted that if involved from the beginning, lawyers can help ―with the fallout 
from the use of force—in the Congress, in the press, or wherever it is‖). 
 148. Bilder, supra note 138; see also Young, supra note 146, at 138 (discuss-
ing the practical functions of attorney-advisers). 
 149. State Department Lawyer Harold H. Koh Urges Lawyers to Stand by 
Principles in Politically Charged Environment, ASC BLOG (June 20, 2011)  
[hereinafter Koh, ASC BLOG], http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/state-department-
lawyer-harold-h-koh-urges-lawyers-to-stand-by-principles-in-politically-cha. 
 150. See Koh, supra note 105, at 13. 
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Administration‘s policies and seeking congressional approval 
often runs against the more idealistic conscience-based depic-
tions of ―L.‖ 
The organization of the office reinforces the importance of 
international law compliance in the context of State Depart-
ment policy goals. ―L‖ has about 170 attorney-advisers151 who 
are overseen by a very thin political layer—the legal adviser 
and one or two special assistants chosen by him. The legal ad-
viser thus must work largely with career lawyers and will not 
have any significant opportunity to change the composition of 
his office. Lacking any meaningful appointment or removal 
power over his staff, the legal adviser will have little capability 
to exercise political oversight and control. The legal adviser, as 
the sole political appointee, can hardly oversee the work of all 
the lawyers directly. Career lawyers will have autonomy and 
primary control over all but the most significant matters.  
Moreover, ‖L‖ assigns attorney-advisers to specific policy 
bureaus of the State Department—which may further invest 
staff attorneys in the policy work of the Department. The in-
centives of these lawyers may over time grow to be aligned with 
the policy bureaus they regularly serve.152 The advantage of 
this is to create stability and institutional knowledge, but the 
structure may cause narrow policy interests to drive legal anal-
ysis. This structure also further diminishes the political control 
of the legal adviser over his staff. 
Within the executive branch, ―L‖ traditionally claimed con-
trol over international law interpretation. As international law 
becomes an important aspect of the policy work of other agen-
cies, however, ―L‖ no longer retains a firm hold on this function. 
International law matters continue to be shifted away from the 
Legal Adviser‘s office as other departments and agencies devel-
op expertise. Former legal adviser Abe Sofaer has observed, 
―[a]s foreign policies become more specialized . . . [other agen-
cies] have the lead in many international issues.‖153 Many 
agencies now have special departments devoted to international 
affairs. Some typical examples include the Environmental Pro-
 
 151. SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 15. 
 152. See Bilder, supra note 138, at 638 (explaining that the organization of 
―L‖ is designed to allow ―close and informal working relationships between the 
Office and the various policy bureaus‖). 
 153. SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 158 (quoting interview with 
Abe Sofaer). 
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tection Agency‘s Office of International and Tribal Affairs or the 
Department of Labor‘s Bureau of International Labor Affairs.154 
The legal adviser‘s office thus faces threats to its autonomy 
from different quarters. Although the legal adviser generally 
maintains that his office serves as the authoritative interpreter 
and coordinator for international law, the legal adviser faces a 
number of obstacles to fulfilling this objective. As Koh has ob-
served, 
Collective government decision-making creates enormous coordina-
tion problems. We in the Legal Adviser‘s Office are not the only law-
yers in government: On any given issue, . . . our Department as a 
whole then needs to coordinate its positions [with] our lawyer clients 
(POTUS/SecState/DepSecState); White House Lawyers (WHCoun-
sel/NSC Legal Counsel/USTR General Counsel); DOD Lawyers (OGC, 
Jt Staff, CoComs, Services, JAGs); DOJ Lawyers (OLC, OSG, Litigat-
ing Divisions-Civ., Crim, OIL, NSD); IC Lawyers (DNI, CIA); DHS 
Lawyers, not to mention lawyers in the Senate and House.155 
In this process, the legal adviser is but one lawyer and lacks 
the authority to consistently coordinate the legal efforts of law-
yers throughout the executive branch, a function that has over 
time shifted to White House lawyers in the Counsel‘s Office and 
the National Security Council.156 
The influence of the legal adviser on centralized decision 
making will depend in large part on the dynamic between the 
White House and the State Department.157 The relationship be-
tween the legal adviser and the White House turns on a num-
ber of factors. Important among these is the relationship be-
tween the President and the Secretary of State and, in turn, 
 
 154. The Mission Statement of the Bureau of International Labor Affairs 
(ILAB) explains that the Bureau 
leads the U.S. Department of Labor‘s efforts to ensure that workers 
around the world are treated fairly and are able to share in the bene-
fits of the global economy. ILAB‘s mission is to use all available inter-
national channels to improve working conditions, raise living stan-
dards, protect workers‘ ability to exercise their rights, and address the 
workplace exploitation of children and other vulnerable populations. 
Bureau of Int‘l Labor Affairs, ILAB Mission Statement, U.S. DEP‘T OF LAB., 
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/mission.htm ( last visited Oct. 22, 2011). 
 155. Koh, supra note 145. 
 156. AMY B. ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, 
JCS, AND NSC 90–91 (1999) (explaining that presidents since Kennedy have 
transitioned from a commitment to cabinet government toward the concept of 
foreign policy run by the White House and the NSC). 
 157. The former legal advisers interviewed for Michael Scharf ‘s study dis-
agreed about whether one‘s client was the President or the Secretary of State, 
but most agreed that they primarily worked for the Secretary and through him 
or her for the President. See SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 173–75. 
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the relationship between the Secretary and his or her legal ad-
viser. The Secretary must assure that the legal adviser has the 
opportunity to weigh in on policy matters and not be shut out of 
the process of providing legal advice within the Department.158 
Moreover, the Secretary must sometimes fight for the legal ad-
viser within the White House.  
Since the Kennedy Administration, the White House has 
sought to centralize control of foreign policy through the Na-
tional Security Council (NSC), sometimes marginalizing or 
shutting out the State Department, along with its legal advis-
er—a pattern that sometimes continues to be played out.159 The 
increasing importance of the NSC has diminished the central 
influence of the State Department, because the NSC legal ad-
viser solicits advice from different agencies and offices and 
manages an inter-agency process in which the State Depart-
ment is but one player. Other White House offices have also as-
serted a centralizing force, such as the Office of the White 
House Counsel.  
Yet the legal adviser can sometimes play an important role 
by providing the White House with the legal rationale it needs, 
even when not directly related to international law. Recently, 
for instance, Koh provided a rationale for what constituted 
―hostilities‖ under the War Powers Resolution, concluding that 
the military activities in Libya did not trigger the statute‘s re-
quirement.160 The White House Counsel signed on to this inter-
pretation, and the President followed this interpretation, ap-
parently bypassing the advice of the Department of Justice.161 
This action triggered the nearly uniform response that such in-
terpretation was unsupported by the Administration‘s own de-
scription of its actions in Libya.162 Moreover, the Administra-
tion was criticized for failing to utilize the usual processes of 
working through the Office of Legal Counsel, to the detriment 
of its legal analysis.163 
 
 158. Id. at 57. 
 159. See ZEGART, supra note 156. 
 160. Savage, supra note 8. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See id. 
 163. See Trevor W. Morrison, Libya, “Hostilities,” the Office of Legal Coun-
sel, and the Process of Executive Branch Legal Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 62, 69–70 (2011) (arguing that although the President has the authori-
ty to overrule OLC, there are a number of institutional reasons why presiden-
tial overruling should be rare, including that the President benefits from 
OLC‘s reputation for providing authoritative opinions). 
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By contrast, during the administration of President George 
W. Bush, the State Department often came into conflict with 
the White House and the Department of Justice. Soon after 
September 11, 2001, a group formed within the White House 
and included the White House Counsel, the Vice President‘s 
Counsel, the Department of Defense General Counsel, the 
Deputy White House Counsel, and Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General for the Office of Legal Counsel.164 The group notably 
excluded the State Department legal adviser and would ―plot 
legal strategy in the war on terrorism, sometimes as a prelude 
to dealing with lawyers from the State Department.‖165  
The White House Counsel eventually determined that the 
Attorney General had primary responsibility for advising the 
President on matters of international law, even though on 
many issues the legal adviser would also be consulted. None-
theless, in the case of conflicting interpretations, the Counsel‘s 
Office determined that the Attorney General would have the 
final call.166 This created a constant source of tension between 
the legal adviser and the Department of Justice. Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice defended the legal adviser by repeated-
ly raising the dispute with the Attorney General.167 The Secre-
tary advocated for her department and its lawyers to maintain 
their traditional functions of advising with regard to the scope 
and applicability of international law, but with little effect. 
In the Bush Administration, the legal adviser was often on 
the losing side of these battles.168 Yet, this does not mean the 
office remained powerless. Because of the different centers of 
power, the legal adviser could appeal to other constituencies—
Congress, the media, sympathetic foreign nations, NGOs, aca-
demics—outside of the White House in order to put pressure on 
centralized decision makers. For example, when President 
Bush decided, after substantial deliberation, that neither al 
 
 164. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 22. 
 165. Id. (emphasis added). 
 166. See id. at 22–24. 
 167. See id. 
 168. Other legal advisers have recounted turf battles with the Department 
of Justice and other agencies. For instance, the Department of Justice sought 
to control U.S. representation before the Iran-United States Claims tribunal in 
The Hague. SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 57. Davis Robinson, the 
legal adviser at the time, noted this raised a serious and difficult ―turf battle‖ 
and eventually the President had to confirm the State Department‘s role in 
representing the U.S. before the international tribunal. Id.; see also ZEGART, 
supra note 156 (describing the accretion of power to NSC and away from the 
State Department through specific examples in different administrations). 
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Qaeda nor Taliban fighters would receive POW status under 
the Geneva Conventions, someone leaked a memo from Secre-
tary of State Colin Powell setting forth disagreements with this 
approach.169 If necessary, the State Department can serve its 
perceived ―mission‖ outside of centralized channels.  
The legal adviser, because he oversees a legal office staffed 
primarily with career bureaucrats who share in the larger mis-
sion and culture of the State Department, may not be the 
quickest or most congenial source of legal advice for the White 
House (except when it is). The focus of this office on the larger 
imperatives of international law and diplomacy may some-
times, quite consciously, fail to provide the type of legal reason-
ing that supports presidential prerogatives and discretion. This 
has sometimes furthered the resolve of the White House to seek 
advice elsewhere. Yet, the State Department‘s advice may tem-
per outcomes. For example, with regard to the applicability of 
the Geneva Conventions to the Taliban, President Bush 
adopted the State Department‘s rationale that the Conventions 
applied to Afghanistan, but that the Taliban were ―unlawful 
combatants‖ who had lost POW status.170 The adoption of this 
rationale and justification may have been important for diplo-
matic stability and other international relationships—issues 
that the State Department represents to the President as part 
of its institutional role. Yet the State Department also displays 
pragmatism and is not above taking forward-leaning interpre-
tations to help the White House, as demonstrated by Koh‘s re-
cent interpretation of the War Powers Resolution. 
Even in the face of waning influence and competition from 
other quarters, the legal adviser‘s office has in general held 
tightly to its mission, which may preserve the culture of the of-
fice and the confidence of policy makers within State Depart-
ment. The legal adviser may find a difficult balance between in-
fluencing White House policy decisions and maintaining its 
independence and particular conscience- or diplomacy-based 
approach.  
 
 169. Memorandum from Colin L. Powell, supra note 3; see also YOO, supra 
note 1, at 39; John Barry et al., The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 
2004, at 26. 
 170. See Memorandum from George W. Bush, supra note 5 (including the 
subject line ―Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees‖). 
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2. Department of Defense Office of the General Counsel 
The General Counsel to the Department of Defense (DoD) 
provides advice on all legal matters to the Secretary of Defense 
and in recent years has taken an increasing role in the inter-
pretation of international law. The Office of the General Coun-
sel (OGC) focuses in large part on the law of war, which in-
cludes both customary international law norms pertaining to 
the law of war, as well as treaties and other conventions. In 
1974, the Secretary of Defense issued a directive establishing 
the DoD Law of War Program.171 The program aimed to ensure 
that ―the armed forces of the United States conduct all military 
operations in compliance with the international law of war and 
to prevent violations of the laws of war.‖172 All members of the 
armed forces must go through law of war training, and legal ad-
visors provide guidance during military operations about law of 
war principles such as military necessity and proportionality.173  
The organizational structure of DoD legal staff is compli-
cated—the lawyers are divided into general counsel, staff judge 
advocates, and legal advisors.174 DoD general counsels are 
mostly civilians who work for the Secretaries of Defense, Army, 
Navy, and Air Force.175 They provide the tasks ordinarily asso-
ciated with general counsel of other agencies, such as assessing 
the legal consequences of proposed policies and working with 
policy makers to implement policies consistent with legal re-
quirements.176 Staff judge advocates are ―traditional military 
lawyers who practice administrative law, criminal law, legal 
assistance, claims, and procurement.‖177 Finally, legal advisors 
to the Unified Combatant Commanders focus on the legal as-
pects of war-fighting, including operational law and interna-
tional agreement management.178 The legal advisor ―helps in-
sure that the United States speaks with one voice in national 
security matters‖ and is an advocate for the orderly develop-
 
 171. Michael F. Lohr & Steve Gallotta, Legal Support in War: The Role of 
Military Lawyers, 4 CHI. J. INT‘L L. 465, 470 n.23 (2003) (citing Dep‘t of Def. 
Directive 5100.77 (revised Dec. 9, 1998)).  
 172. Id. at 470. 
 173. Id. at 470–71. 
 174. A helpful account of the structure of Department of Defense lawyers 
can be found in William George Eckhardt, Lawyering for Uncle Sam When He 
Draws His Sword, 4 U. CHI. J. INT‘L L. 431, 433 (2003). 
 175. Id. 
 176. See id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 434. 
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ment of international law.179 After restructuring in the 1990s, 
the general counsel of the military departments were designat-
ed as the ―chief legal officers‖ of their respective departments 
and oversee both civilian and military attorneys.180  
DoD has thousands of civilian and military lawyers. Some 
are civilian political appointments, but a significant proportion 
of lawyers are career staff. The sheer size and diversity of func-
tions and purposes makes it difficult to capture in this brief ac-
count the various incentives and dynamics among the legal staff.  
There are, however, some recurring themes in the military 
legal tradition. Within DoD exists a culture of honor that focus-
es on how particular interpretations of international law and 
the law of war will affect the reputation of the armed services. 
When evaluating various policy options, the emphasis on mili-
tary honor may be presented as a reason for compliance with 
international law. In this view, the military should hold itself 
to the highest international standards, even if the United 
States has not specifically accepted a particular treaty or for-
mulation of customary international law. 
For example, in the debate about whether the Geneva 
Conventions applied to al Qaeda and Taliban fighters, the Bush 
Administration determined that such protections would not ap-
ply.181 There was, however, significant dispute internally about 
the legal reasons for this conclusion.182 The Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Richard Myers took the position that the 
Geneva Conventions were ―‗ingrained in U.S. military culture,‘ 
that ‗an American soldier‘s self-image is bound up with the 
Conventions,‘ and that ‗[a]s we want our troops, if captured, 
treated according to the Conventions, we have to encourage re-
spect for the law by our own example.‘‖183 
The military lawyers argued for treating the Geneva Con-
ventions as customary international law, making it irrelevant 
whether al Qaeda had signed the Conventions.184 They insisted 
that ―the principles applied to any war and to anyone that the 
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United States fought.‖185 This sentiment requires holding the 
military to a certain standard, regardless of whether an argu-
ment could be made that the treaty did not apply in a particu-
lar circumstance. This approach is often justified as a pragmat-
ic attempt to ensure protection for U.S. troops overseas—
grounds for reciprocal treatment under the laws of war.186  
There is a public relations aspect to this as well. Some for-
mer military lawyers have argued that the United States must 
always try to keep up world public opinion by justifying and 
explaining military actions and the use of force.187 Working 
within a culture of legal accountability and public opinion both 
at home and abroad, military lawyers often seek to ensure that 
military actions can be justified under international law, par-
ticularly the laws of war. This preserves the reputation of the 
U.S. military both at home and abroad, especially with other 
democracies.188 Some observers have suggested that DoD law-
yers have substantially internalized these norms.189  
Yet, depending on the circumstances, DoD may define in-
ternational law norms to preserve military flexibility. A recent 
example, in the debate over the extent to which the United 
States can kill Islamist militants in areas such as Yemen and 
Somalia that are outside the battlefield in Afghanistan and 
areas of Pakistan, DoD general counsel, Jeh Johnson, has tak-
en the view that the United States can target groups aligned 
with al Qaeda in countries that are unable or unwilling to sup-
press them.190 By contrast, State Department legal adviser Koh 
has argued that the United States can take action outside the 
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battlefield only in self-defense, a standard that would comport 
with the views of European allies.191 
Another cultural dynamic within the Pentagon relates to 
risk-averse behavior by military commanders who fear public 
scrutiny and legal consequences of their actions and thus may 
depend upon military lawyers to sanction the legality of the use 
of force. Military lawyers thus may be used as a shield from the 
legal consequences that may follow from the use of force.192 Simi-
larly, lawyers may help the military operators act close to the 
legal line.193 On the battlefield, JAG officers provide advice 
about the scope of proposed actions and seek to ensure com-
pliance with international law.194  
Although DoD values its reputation and culture of com-
pliance with the laws of war, determining the contours of the 
law of war poses difficulties. There will often be debate about 
what precisely such law requires, because although some law of 
war is codified in treaties, most of it remains customary inter-
national law. In addition, many of the standards of the law of 
war turn on contextual factors such as necessity and propor-
tionality.195 Choosing between various actions may turn on fac-
tual assessments and policy considerations rather than on legal 
analysis because there will often be a spectrum of lawful op-
tions available.196 ―The laws of war are often written in vague 
terms, and are subject to different interpretations. They prohi-
bit, for example, ‗disproportionate‘ casualties and ‗outrages 
upon personal dignity‘—terms that can mean very different 
things to different people, and that can easily be used as rhe-
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torical weapons.‖197 The malleability of these standards allows 
for multiple interpretations, and these interpretations may de-
pend in part on the incentives and interests of the particular 
military lawyers. 
Divisions over legal interpretation may arise between civi-
lian and military lawyers, as well as between political and ca-
reer attorneys. For example, John Yoo has identified a growing 
tension between civilian-military relations with respect to mili-
tary policy and legal interpretation.198 Yoo applies a principal-
agent framework to the civilian-military relationship and notes 
that, particularly in the war on terrorism, the eventual goal 
remains unclear and the civilians and military may well have 
different preferences about how to proceed.199 In bringing their 
opinions to the White House, civilian attorneys will likely have 
the upper hand, in part because structurally the DoD general 
counsel now oversees both civilian and military lawyers.  
Yet, because of the size and scope of DoD, and the strong 
sense of culture and mission held by many of the career law-
yers, it is sometimes possible for them to influence military pol-
icy through other channels, such as by appealing to the courts, 
Congress, and the media. For example, one way military law-
yers can control policy is by dividing the ―principal‖ into its 
component parts: ―In the war on terrorism, for example, JAG 
opponents of President Bush‘s policies went to Congress and 
testified against the administration‘s positions on the military 
commission bill. JAG lawyers representing detainees at Guan-
tanamo Bay also brought suit in federal court to enjoin military 
commission proceedings from taking place.‖200 Judicial review 
of these issues would be disruptive to the President‘s attempts 
to coordinate policy. As Yoo indicates, ―The JAGs‘ appeal to in-
ternational law is understandable as an effort to create more 
autonomy by introducing foreign governments, international 
entities and NGOs into the principals‘ decisionmaking 
process.‖201 Lawyers within the DoD tried to use international 
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law to drive policy in a direction at odds with its civilian lea-
dership and with the decisions made by the White House.202 
As with the State Department legal adviser, failure to in-
fluence centralized White House decision making does not nec-
essarily cause agency lawyers to fall in line and adopt the 
White House perspective. Quite the contrary, career lawyers 
may seek to further their autonomy by deliberately pursuing a 
course at odds with the administration. Career lawyers may 
have greater allegiance to a principle of military honor or to 
general principles of customary international law. When their 
analysis conflicts with the Commander-in-Chief ‘s interpreta-
tion of international law, the White House will often face diffi-
culty in reigning in this sort of disagreement—continuing re-
calcitrance can exact a cost on an administration forced to 
battle with critics from within its own agencies. 
3. Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel 
The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) is a small, elite office 
within the Department of Justice that interprets the Constitu-
tion and federal laws for the executive branch. It is often called 
upon to advise the President about the scope of his constitu-
tional authority, including at times the requirements of inter-
national law. By statute, the Attorney General gives opinions 
on matters of law to the President,203 and this opinion-writing 
function has been largely delegated to OLC.204 OLC‘s best prac-
tices memorandum explains that its ―central function‖ is to fur-
ther the President‘s constitutional duties to preserve, protect, 
and defend the Constitution and to take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed.205 To accomplish this,  
OLC must provide advice based on its best understanding of what the 
law requires—not simply an advocate‘s defense of the contemplated 
action or position proposed by an agency or the Administration. Thus, 
in rendering legal advice, OLC seeks to provide an accurate and hon-
est appraisal of applicable law, even if that appraisal will constrain 
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the Administration‘s or an agency‘s pursuit of desired practices or pol-
icy objectives.206 
The structure of OLC allows for a significant degree of po-
litical control over the office. The office usually has about twen-
ty attorneys—on average a third are talented career lawyers 
who have served at OLC for many years and across administra-
tions. The others are either political appointees or young law-
yers chosen by political appointees because they share the gen-
eral legal philosophy of the current administration. The 
President appoints the head of the office, the Assistant Attor-
ney General for OLC. Indeed, the White House often takes spe-
cial interest in the appointment of the head of OLC, more so 
than for other assistant attorneys general, precisely because of 
the close relationship between OLC and the White House.207 
Although the Assistant Attorney General for OLC reports di-
rectly to the Attorney General, he also has other clients, per-
haps most importantly the White House and the White House 
Counsel‘s Office.208  
OLC has a culture of providing impartial legal advice of the 
highest quality. In the traditional view, OLC should render qu-
asi-judicial advice, aiming to provide legal advice free from po-
litical and policy calculations. As former Assistant Attorney 
General for OLC Jack Goldsmith explains, ―[T]he office has de-
veloped powerful cultural norms about the importance of pro-
viding the President with detached, apolitical legal advice, as if 
OLC were an independent court inside the executive 
branch.‖209 Both the long-serving attorneys and those passing 
through on their way to other appointments strive to maintain 
the office‘s reputation for impartiality and high quality legal 
analysis.210 
Yet many of those who have worked in OLC have found 
that this traditional view does not fully capture how OLC ful-
fills its role, nor how it should fulfill its role and its obligation 
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to the President. Goldsmith notes that OLC should be political-
ly attuned to the policies of the administration, which means 
―OLC is not entirely neutral to the President‘s agenda‖ and the 
President should get the benefit of the doubt with respect to le-
gal advice.211 Similarly, John McGinnis explains that the cen-
tral dilemma for the head of OLC is to provide ―his key patrons, 
the White House Counsel and the Attorney General, with ad-
vice and opinions they find generally congenial while at the 
same time upholding the reputation of the office as an elite in-
stitution whose legal advice is independent of the policy and po-
litical pressures associated with a particular question.‖212 
Across administrations, OLC seeks to maintain a reputation as 
a source of independent legal advice while also preserving an 
institutional perspective favorable to the exercise of presiden-
tial power and protecting the President‘s authority, particularly 
during times of war or crisis. Invariably, OLC finds that it must 
balance the various pressures of the office to provide careful le-
gal advice, while also serving the interests of the President.213 
OLC has a distinct and unusual role because it serves not 
only the agency of which it is a part, the Department of Justice, 
but also operates as a specialized referral office for other agen-
cies in the executive branch. Most legal offices serve only their 
particular agencies, but OLC provides advice to agencies and 
entities throughout the executive branch.214 When requested, 
OLC will provide advice to other executive branch agencies on 
difficult questions of law or with respect to an intra-agency dis-
pute referred to OLC for an ―outside‖ legal opinion. Agencies 
seek formal OLC opinions for a variety of reasons, including to 
answer difficult questions or to deflect the political conse-
quences of a particular legal decision.215 OLC also may serve as 
a referee between two agencies with differing legal interpreta-
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tions.216 OLC opinions are generally treated as controlling 
within the executive branch on questions of law and therefore 
bind the actions of executive officials.217 
In domestic matters, if OLC‘s opinion is sought, its ability 
to issue binding interpretations for the executive branch is rel-
atively unchallenged, but it faces greater competition from oth-
er agencies with regard to international law. For instance, OLC 
participates in the interagency process run by the National Se-
curity Council legal advisor, in which agencies can work 
through their differences about the interpretation and applica-
tion of international law. A number of legal disputes are re-
solved informally in this process. If agreement cannot be 
reached, OLC might be called upon to resolve a dispute be-
tween agencies about the proper application of international 
law. Yet the State Department legal adviser and counsel from 
other agencies will often resist this role for OLC and press their 
own institutional competence, expertise, and authority in mat-
ters of foreign and military legal policy. 
Nevertheless, OLC plays an ongoing role in international 
law interpretation. In ordinary times, OLC may be asked to de-
termine whether a treaty is self-executing, how treaties should 
be interpreted in light of ratifying statutes, and the extent to 
which international agreements constrain proposed U.S. action. 
During the war on terrorism, OLC has been asked to analyze 
difficult and sensitive questions about the scope of interroga-
tion methods, the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to al 
Qaeda and Taliban fighters, the use of warrantless surveillance 
techniques, and the legality drone attacks in a variety of cir-
cumstances. 
As numerous accounts of the Bush Administration have 
detailed, OLC became a significant source of legal advice for 
the White House during the months and years following the at-
tacks of September 11, 2001.218 In this role, OLC often came in-
to conflict with the State Department. As John Yoo explains, 
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OLC and the State Department often disagreed about the ap-
plicability of non-treaty international law and also about specif-
ic legal decisions such as whether the Geneva Conventions 
would apply to Taliban prisoners of war.219 During this time, 
OLC exercised significant control over legal determinations re-
lating to the war on terrorism, and other sources of legal ad-
vice, such as the State Department Legal Adviser, were often 
kept out of the loop.220  
Yet OLC does not enjoy a permanent monopoly on advice. 
The office operated without a confirmed head for nearly seven 
years, including the first two and half years of the Obama Ad-
ministration.221 Recently, President Obama determined that 
military activities in Libya did not constitute ―hostilities‖ for 
the purposes of the War Powers Resolution, adopting Koh‘s ra-
tionale reportedly over the disagreement of OLC and the De-
partment of Justice.222  
The Libya example demonstrates how the incentives for of-
fering particular types of legal advice may be more complicated 
for OLC than for other agencies, precisely because its ―busi-
ness‖ and its reputation depend upon other branches coming to 
them with legal problems. As Nelson Lund has observed, OLC 
faces competition for providing legal advice from countless oth-
er lawyers within the executive branch.223 The function of OLC 
is ―wholly advisory, and there is almost nothing that both must 
be done and must be done by OLC.‖224 If the Attorney General, 
other agencies, or the President lose confidence in OLC, they 
can easily turn to other sources of legal advice. Moreover, if the 
White House receives informal OLC advice that it disagrees 
with or if the White House believes that OLC‘s analysis will not 
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support a proposed course of action, the White House may 
simply decline to seek a formal OLC opinion.  
This competition to control the provision of legal advice af-
fects the behavior of OLC, particularly the Assistant Attorney 
General who heads the office. As Lund explains, the importance 
and influence of OLC will depend on what the head chooses to 
make of it and the functions of OLC will be ―determined pri-
marily by its relationship with the White House.‖225 The rela-
tionship between OLC and the White House Counsel‘s Office is 
often a close one in which legal opinions are often provided in-
formally and cooperatively. Lund argues that the incentives for 
the head of OLC suggest that the office will be more responsive 
to the interests of the White House than to other agencies and 
will assist the White House in maintaining control over the le-
gal policy of other agencies.226 These observations comport with 
the historical role of OLC, the individuals appointed to lead the 
office, and their subsequent appointments to the judiciary and 
other high-ranking government positions. 
The incentives facing OLC provide some understanding of 
why that office has traditionally viewed international law ques-
tions from the President‘s perspective and has generally been 
deferential to his decision-making authority with regard to in-
ternational law. For example, OLC has typically defined cus-
tomary international law narrowly, relying primarily on histor-
ical state practices as opposed to forward-leaning 
interpretations of new forms of customary international law.227 
The debate over the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to 
al Qaeda and Taliban fighters highlights these institutional dif-
ferences. OLC argued that the Geneva Conventions ―had not 
assumed the status of customary international law that bound 
the United States . . . . There was no customary international 
law on terrorist organizations like al Qaeda that could launch a 
devastating international attack.‖228 By contrast, the State De-
partment argued that the Conventions must apply to Afghanis-
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tan, even if not to the Taliban fighters specifically, because of 
the consequences of declaring Afghanistan to be a ―failed 
state.‖229 Secretary Powell‘s memo to President Bush explained 
that application of the Conventions to Afghanistan was neces-
sary because it ―preserves U.S. credibility and moral authority 
by taking the high ground, and puts us in a better position to 
demand and receive international support.‖230  
OLC‘s incentives encourage providing the President with 
legal interpretations that keep open political options, particu-
larly with regard to foreign affairs. OLC is more likely than 
some of the other legal departments to interpret law in light of 
the President‘s constitutional authority. This allows OLC to be 
more ―useful‖ than other agencies to the White House when it 
contemplates actions close to the line of what international law 
forbids. OLC sometimes says ―no,‖ but when it does, it risks, 
perhaps more than other agencies, the President turning to 
other sources of advice.  
4. National Security Council Legal Advisor 
The National Security Council (NSC) was created by the 
National Security Act of 1947 and was intended to ―advise the 
President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, 
and military policies relating to the national security.‖231 Operat-
ing from the White House, the NSC coordinates agencies dealing 
with defense and foreign policy and helps the President imple-
ment his foreign policies by getting these agencies to work to-
gether.232 To be effective, however, the NSC must do more than 
just coordinate. It must ―define a presidential strategy for the 
conduct of foreign and military affairs. The President has both 
unique responsibilities and a unique perspective; his breadth of 
view is not likely to be shared by any single agency.‖233  
NSC assists the President by considering national security 
issues from his viewpoint—filtering the demands of national 
security through the full range of the President‘s foreign policy 
and military objectives, as well as his unique and singular re-
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sponsibilities. Since the 1960s, national security advisors ―have 
clearly seen themselves as the president‘s men; they have en-
gaged in policy debates, offered policy advice, and managed the 
NSC process in ways that serve the particular political inter-
ests of the president and no one else.‖234 Over time, the NSC 
has become a key center of foreign policymaking. The staff has 
significantly increased in size and is comprised of presidential 
appointees who are ―expected to view foreign policy from his 
perspective.‖235  
President Reagan created the position of legal advisor to 
the NSC in 1987.236 As with other members of the NSC staff, 
the legal advisor is appointed by the President and takes on the 
obligation to represent the presidential perspective in working 
through disputes with other agencies.237 The President often 
appoints the legal advisor from elsewhere in the White House, 
as President Reagan did with the first advisor.238 During the 
George W. Bush Administration, several of the NSC legal advi-
sors were picked from the White House Counsel‘s Office. This 
ensures that the advisors were familiar to the President and 
key White House staff and could be trusted to represent the 
President‘s perspective with respect to international law  
matters.239  
The NSC legal advisor coordinates foreign legal policy be-
tween the State and Defense Departments, the military, and 
the intelligence agencies. He controls the interagency process 
with regard to questions of international law and referees turf 
wars between the various agencies, including in particular the 
State Department legal adviser and the Office of Legal Coun-
sel. Consistent with the culture of NSC, the legal advisor serves 
the President‘s interests and mediates conflicts in light of the 
core constitutional powers and prerogatives of the President as 
Commander-in-Chief. Although this position has received little 
scholarly or media attention, the NSC legal advisor can exert 
significant influence on the interpretation of international law, 
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determining its scope and how it will apply to proposed presi-
dential actions. The legal advisor must enjoy the trust and con-
fidence of the President, who can closely monitor the work of 
NSC. ―Armed with rewards, sanctions, and a direct monitoring 
ability, the president could trust the NSC staff to weigh and as-
sess the conflicting policy recommendations coming from the 
foreign policy bureaucracies.‖240 Over time, this dynamic has 
significantly increased the authority of the NSC and its legal 
advisor in relation to the other agencies. 
  * * *   
This Part has analyzed several of the key legal offices in-
volved with making determinations about international law 
compliance. Although it does not examine all of the offices in 
the executive branch that handle matters of international law, 
it identifies the entities primarily responsible for international 
law interpretation. The agencies discussed here represent the 
wide diversity of interests and incentives within the executive 
branch, as well as various structural differences in how these 
offices operate both internally and in their relation to other 
agencies. It demonstrates how these agencies balance the dic-
tates of law and policy in different ways based on their particu-
lar perspectives. The next Part focuses on how the President 
seeks to coordinate these diverse approaches and use them to 
his advantage.  
III.  COORDINATION FAILURES AND COMPETITION 
WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH   
The public choice analysis demonstrates that there are 
many different individuals and agencies that impact centra-
lized decisions about international law compliance. Lawyers 
throughout the executive branch analyze the scope and appli-
cability of international law. These lawyers have different in-
terests and incentives and often approach questions of interna-
tional law from their particular perspectives, which are shaped 
by, inter alia, the specific interests of the agencies they serve, 
the norms and culture of their offices, the interaction between 
political and career lawyers, and the relationship of their agen-
cies to the White House.  
This Part examines institutional mechanisms within the 
bureaucracy for dealing with difficulties of coordination that 
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arise from having conflicting interpretations of international 
law. First, it describes the available institutions for coordina-
tion of international law interpretation and observes that such 
coordination is uncertain and imperfect. Second, it predicts how 
agencies will behave within these constraints. The lack of coor-
dination creates instability and uncertainty that makes it ra-
tional for agencies to continue to press their different perspec-
tives and compete for control over interpretation of 
international law. Third, it raises, but does not answer, the 
question of whether such a system benefits the President by 
presenting a robust debate over difficult questions of interna-
tional law and policy.  
A. IMPERFECT COORDINATION 
The difficulties of coordinating our vast bureaucracy have 
been well-developed in the domestic context.241 Moreover, scho-
lars have addressed the difficulties of asserting presidential 
control over the administrative state, again, largely with refer-
ence to domestic regulation.242 These insights, however, have 
for the most part not played a significant role in understanding 
compliance with international law. Instead, many of the unita-
ry theories discussed above assume that despite the difficulties 
of coordination and control, the ―state‖ formulates decisions 
about international law in a coherent and unitary manner. 
Even those who would disaggregate the state, like Slaughter 
and Koh, focus on the possibilities and promise of decentralized 
action, not on the problems that can and do result from deci-
sions about international policy being made by numerous agen-
cy entities.243 
Yet coordination and cooperation present significant diffi-
culties for the purpose of international law compliance. There is 
no consistent process for sifting through and coordinating these 
agency perspectives, interests, and incentives when interpret-
ing international law. Congress and the President have made 
efforts to impose centralized control over these issues, but coor-
dination efforts have generally not succeeded in unifying pers-
pectives on international law in a systematic or consistent 
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way.244 As James Q. Wilson observed, given the ―incomplete 
control the president has over many important subordinates, it 
is hardly surprising that presidents have taken to reorganiza-
tions the way overweight people take to fad diets—and with 
about the same results.‖245 
For example, the Office of Legal Counsel, NSC legal advi-
sor, and the State Department all have some authority to coor-
dinate questions of international law. The Attorney General, 
and as a practical matter, the Office of Legal Counsel, have 
been delegated responsibility for resolving legal disputes be-
tween agencies, including on matters of international law. Yet 
OLC can only resolve disputes that are referred to it. The 
White House may decline to seek a formal OLC opinion when it 
has reason to believe the opinion will be unfavorable to the 
President‘s preferred alternative. Accordingly, OLC‘s authority 
to coordinate executive branch legal policy waxes and wanes 
depending on the extent to which it enjoys the trust of the 
White House and other agencies.246  
In the George W. Bush Administration, OLC played a cen-
tral role in assessing legal issues arising from the War on Ter-
ror. Recently, however, President Obama effectively shut out 
OLC‘s institutional role in determining whether military ac-
tions in Libya constituted ―hostilities‖ for the purposes of the 
War Powers Resolution.247 Rather than rely on OLC to solicit 
opinions from the relevant agencies, OLC was reportedly one of 
several offices to submit its opinion to the President, who made 
the final decision against the advice of the Department of Jus-
tice and along the lines suggested by the State Department le-
gal adviser Harold Koh.248 
Similarly, the legal advisor to the National Security Coun-
cil oversees an interagency process that serves to mediate di-
vergent agency perspectives. This creates a centralized process 
in the White House that is run by hand-picked advisors 
representing the President‘s unique perspective. Historically, 
the State Department legal adviser has asserted a central and 
 
 244. See ZEGART, supra note 156, at 37–38. 
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authoritative role with regard to the interpretation of, and 
compliance with, international law. As discussed above, howev-
er, the legal adviser‘s authority has diminished over the years 
as the White House has sought to centralize this function in the 
NSC and as other agencies have developed expertise on mat-
ters of international law.249 The legal adviser, however, can still 
gain the ear of the President, depending on the particular issue 
and the level of personal trust between them. 
This highlights not only the multiple sources of legal ad-
vice, but also the absence of any singular mechanism for resolv-
ing legal disputes between agencies. Although counsel and poli-
cy makers often resolve their differences through OLC, 
negotiation within the NSC, or various informal processes, 
there is no necessary manner in which advice on international 
law must be sought or implemented when legal advisors disag-
ree. Even the mechanisms that do exist, such as through NSC 
or OLC, can be easily bypassed by White House officials and 
other policy makers if they choose to do so.  
Of course, the President can always overcome coordination 
failures. The executive branch benefits from having a unitary 
and powerful head who directs foreign policy and in theory can 
ultimately decide questions of international law.250 The ability 
of the President to bypass squabbling between agencies and 
formulate his own position with regard to international law re-
tains the possibility of strong unitary action.  
Practically speaking, however, the President cannot formu-
late independent legal policy on every question of international 
law. He must rely on the many advisors within the executive 
branch who analyze these questions and he cannot fully control 
the type of legal advice he receives. Lawyers within the execu-
tive branch may have ideological views of law and policy that 
conflict with the President‘s perspective, or that serve a nar-
rower agency interest, or that elevate the importance of inter-
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national law over other interests. The President may be asked 
to resolve the most high-profile disputes over the applicability 
of international law or he may take a particular interest in 
some issues. Other consequential decisions, however, may not 
rise to the level of presidential or centralized decision making.  
Furthermore, even on matters in which the President has 
made a final resolution, he cannot always guarantee its full ex-
ecution. Agencies may continue to pursue divergent policies de-
spite White House decision. The rifts over legal policy are a 
subset of a broader category of foreign policy disputes. For ex-
ample, with the recent popular uprising in Egypt, President 
Obama found his Secretary of State and envoy to Egypt carry-
ing a different message than the one he wanted to send.251 The 
Secretary of State adopted a more traditional foreign policy 
view, focusing on stability in the region, whereas the President 
eventually supported the protesters and the push for democra-
cy.252 Likewise, on intervention in Libya, various administra-
tion officials expressed different perspectives on its advisability 
and relation to the national interest. Charlie Savage, the New 
York Times reporter who has uncovered a number of executive 
branch disputes, has quipped that perhaps his reporting serves 
an interagency coordination function.253 
Agencies and legal advisors have a vested interest in their 
preferred policies and legal interpretations and often have 
agendas independent of the President. The President‘s decision 
to go in one direction will not necessarily eliminate resistance 
within his administration. Even if the political leadership at 
the agencies falls into line with the President, as may be ex-
pected, there may be counsel who remain faithful to their agen-
cy culture or mission. Career attorneys in powerful agencies 
such as the Departments of State and Defense may persist in 
championing perspectives at odds with the President by appeal-
ing to Congress, the media, or nongovernmental organiza-
tions.254 Even speculation about dissenting perspectives can 
undermine public confidence in the President‘s decision. In 
these instances, the President may pursue one course while his 
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subordinates continue to advance another or leak dissenting le-
gal perspectives. Although the unitary structure of our execu-
tive branch is designed to minimize such occurrences, the sheer 
size and scope of the federal bureaucracy make it difficult for 
the President to fully coordinate the efforts of his subordinates.  
Existing coordination mechanisms have not succeeded in 
establishing a clear hierarchy of authority. The President may 
at any time simply interpret the law, but short of this, there 
remain a number of offices and agencies that lay claim to con-
trolling international law interpretation. Depending on the par-
ticular individuals as well as other political dynamics between 
the agencies and the White House, one or another office may 
manage to gain the ear of the White House.  
B. INSTABILITY ENCOURAGES COMPETITION 
The lack of coordination results in unpredictability about 
the pathways of international legal interpretation. Faced with 
a shifting landscape in which there is always the possibility of 
imposing a different legal viewpoint, agencies will have an in-
centive to press their perspectives. Rational agencies will re-
spond to this institutional instability by competing for control 
over international policy and legal interpretation. Because 
agency heads do not know in any particular circumstance what 
interpretation or policy will be chosen, it is rational for them to 
expend political capital for the adoption of their preferred al-
ternative.  
Bureaucratic politics are especially important in foreign af-
fairs because there are fewer domestic interest groups and leg-
islative tools for addressing these issues are often ineffective or 
difficult for Congress to mobilize.255 Executive branch agencies 
therefore control more decision making in this area, at least at 
the outset. Bureaucratic competition is especially prevalent 
with respect to foreign affairs and national security because a 
number of different agencies have overlapping jurisdiction—the 
State Department, the Department of Defense, the Department 
of Homeland Security, and intelligence agencies all have a 
stake in foreign matters and the interpretation of international 
law. The shared area is greater in foreign affairs and national 
security than in domestic affairs: ―Their activities inherently 
overlap and intersect. Diplomatic negotiations have serious 
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consequences for military action and vice versa. Intelligence is 
intimately connected to grand strategy, military power, and 
diplomacy. To do their jobs, national security officials must 
concern themselves with other agencies.‖256  
 Moreover, competition in this area tends to be exaggerated 
because of the perceived or actual indeterminacy of interna-
tional law. New types of warfare and evolving technological ca-
pacity raise difficult questions in areas in which there is little 
or no state practice and few relevant judicial decisions, allow-
ing for a range of legitimate interpretations. In this context, 
agencies may compete to define the range of what is legally 
permissible, but also what course of action is moral, militarily 
possible, diplomatically feasible, and politically desirable. 
C. PRESIDENT‘S ADVANTAGE? 
Given all of the attempts at coordination, one might as-
sume that the President would prefer greater control over the 
bureaucracy. Indeed, a system in which there is only imperfect 
coordination and ongoing competition has significant costs. It 
can result in instability and uncertainty and the possibility 
that dissenting views will persist within the agencies, making 
it difficult for the President to implement his chosen policies. 
Domestically, bureaucratic competition may allow for flexibili-
ty, but also the possibility of confusion and the opportunity for 
powerful agency interests to proceed in a manner contrary to 
the President‘s directives. Overseas, displays of intra-
governmental disputes may make it difficult for the President 
to credibly commit to compliance on behalf of the United 
States. 
Although this process can be viewed as a ―failure‖ of coor-
dination, a disaggregated system of agency competition could 
offer some benefits to the President. The persistence—and in-
deed acceleration—of disaggregation in the executive branch 
(in the form of new agencies)257 suggests that it provides some 
advantages to the President. Many of the agencies are initiated 
or created by the President and these are more closely subject 
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to White House control.258 Agency competition over interna-
tional law interpretation and policy provides the President with 
analysis from a diverse range of perspectives that may take in-
to account the diplomatic, strategic, military, and intelligence 
consequences resulting from particular courses of action. Main-
taining competition and flexibility in international law inter-
pretation can serve the President‘s interests by providing more 
information and keeping open a wider range of policy  
alternatives.259  
The agencies are well designed to represent their particu-
lar interests. Separation of interests and perspectives may al-
low ambition to counteract ambition within the different agen-
cies in the executive branch.260 Unanimity being impossible and 
perhaps undesirable, it may be better to allow competing posi-
tions to have it out in the inter-agency process.  
On important issues, the President can have a full hearing 
from agencies with different perspectives, providing him with 
more information about the implications and consequences of a 
foreign policy or military decision. Moreover, agencies 
represent different constituencies and interests, helping the 
President to remain democratically accountable. The executive 
power rests ultimately with the President, but he may best be 
able to exercise this power by allowing his advisors to represent 
their particular perspectives.  
If Presidents wanted to assert only their constitutional 
prerogatives, they could rely on close legal and political advi-
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sors within the White House, but they generally do not, be-
cause they want to know all of the political, diplomatic, and 
strategic possibilities consistent with the law. The White House 
generally does not allow for the permanent supremacy of one 
agency over the others. For example, even if OLC has presump-
tive authority to settle executive branch disputes, the office can 
be bypassed if the White House declines to get a formal opinion 
or the President determines to follow the legal analysis of 
another agency. This uncertainty creates a strong incentive for 
the agencies to represent their perspectives robustly in compe-
tition with others. By contrast, if the President always relied on 
a singular source for advice about international law, other agen-
cies would eventually expend resources in a different direction.  
Ongoing agency competition ensures that a variety of dif-
ferent approaches may be assessed as compliant with interna-
tional law. This flexibility provides the President a wider range 
of alternatives when dealing with other nations. Where possi-
ble, the President can decide on policy, not legal grounds. Ongo-
ing competition may present a process for formulating the best, 
most considered state interests. In addition, such competition 
may sometimes be useful to the President because it allows him 
to find a legal rationale for his favored policy. Presidents often 
interpret the law in light of their particular interests, which 
may be simply part of the President‘s authority to execute the 
laws.261 
Yet there are costs to an institutional lack of coordination: 
such a system makes it harder to impose a unitary will at the 
end of a fractured process with strongly developed interests. 
Lack of centralized control may make it difficult for the Presi-
dent to work with Congress or to credibly engage with foreign 
countries. Whether this system ultimately serves national in-
terests or even the President‘s interests is beyond the scope of 
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this Article. The dynamic of inconsistent coordination and on-
going competition, however, has consequences for the develop-
ment of international law and the possibility of systemic com-
pliance by states, as discussed in the next Part. 
IV.  CONSEQUENCES OF PUBLIC CHOICE ANALYSIS   
The public choice perspective presented in this Article 
identifies the incentives and interests of government officials 
responsible for the interpretation of international law. Moreo-
ver, it suggests that these interests will often diverge and as an 
institutional matter the executive lacks consistent mechanisms 
for coordinating interests. In this environment of uncertainty, 
agencies will continue to compete for control of central decision 
making about questions of international law.  
This Part explains three different consequences that follow 
from this analysis. First, it highlights the limitations of unitary 
state actor theories for predicting compliance with internation-
al law. The executive branch provides the best possibility for 
unitary-state action. Yet even in this branch the failure to 
coordinate interpretation and the existence of ongoing competi-
tion between agencies undermine the assumption of the state 
as a unitary actor. The public choice analysis may be comple-
mentary, however, to rational choice theories by providing an 
account of how states formulate their interests and objectives 
with regard to international law compliance.  
Second, agency competition will encourage exploiting the 
indeterminacy of international law. This is a consequence of the 
type of domestic actors involved, their incentives and prefe-
rences, and how they work within the institutions of the execu-
tive branch. As discussed above, inconsistent coordination be-
tween different agency interests results in instability that 
creates incentives for competition between agency officials for 
control over the interpretation of international law.262 States as 
well as sub-state actors may prefer to retain flexibility and am-
biguity in international law, because this will allow officials to 
present a wide range of policy alternatives as compliant with 
international law. Instead of developing habits of compliance, 
as other liberal or disaggregated theories predict, government 
officials may internalize a habit of flexible or instrumental 
compliance—they will figure out how to make their preferred 
policies compliant with international law.  
 
 262. See supra Part III.B. 
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Finally, the public choice account may provide another ex-
planation for why international law does not exhibit the clarity 
and enforcement often considered an aspiration for interna-
tional law. Greater clarity in international law, both treaties 
and customary international law, would limit the range of ―law-
ful‖ options available to agency officials competing for control of 
international legal interpretation. The ongoing disagreement 
about the meaning and application of international law in some 
contexts may make it difficult to assert a fixed meaning of in-
ternational law. Whether this dynamic observed in the United 
States will impact the development of international law will 
depend in part on whether other states exhibit similar bureau-
cratic competition and strategic uses of international law.  
Liberal theories that focus on domestic preferences predict 
that a shift to non-state actors will further the development 
and compliance with international law by states. By contrast, 
the public choice model looks at both domestic preferences and 
institutional coordination mechanisms and predicts that sub-
state actors will have strong incentives to keep international 
law relatively indeterminate and flexible. Efforts to make in-
ternational law more law-like or ―hard‖ will face resistance, not 
only among states, but also among sub-state actors.  
A. LIMITATIONS OF UNITARY STATE THEORIES 
As explained in Part I, many of the predominant theories 
of international law model the state as a unitary actor and seek 
to explain international law compliance by reference to the be-
havior of this institutional ―individual.‖ Unitary-state models 
have longstanding appeal in part because they simplify nation-
al complexity to explain why states comply with international 
law. Pulling apart the incentives and interests of legal depart-
ments in the executive branch highlights some of the limita-
tions of unitary state models. Public choice demonstrates that 
even in the unitary executive branch, there is no consistent or 
predictable method for coordinating divergent interests be-
tween agencies.  
These conclusions do not have to lead to radical state skep-
ticism, nor do they discount the idea that the state can behave 
as if a unitary entity. Indeed, for many purposes, the state in-
teracts with the international community as a singular entity. 
States wage war, sign treaties, make trade agreements, and 
engage in diplomacy. Unitariness captures an important aspect 
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of the state‘s legal personality in international law.263 Yet uni-
tary theories have difficulty explaining how states formulate 
their interests and goals, which in turn diminishes their ability 
to make predictions about international law compliance. The 
public choice critique notes the incompleteness of unitary ac-
counts and their thinness when pressed about how to under-
stand state interests and state behavior with respect to inter-
national law.  
Unitary-state theories do not deny that the state is an ag-
gregation of various individuals and entities—they model the 
state ―as if‖ it were a unitary actor for the purpose of making 
predictions about state behavior.264 They suggest that the sim-
plified unitary-state model has more explanatory power.265 
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Theorists who posit with a unitary state have generally as-
sumed the existence of mechanisms for coordinating state in-
terests, but have provided scant account of how such mechan-
isms might operate given the expansive and diverse 
bureaucratic state and the competing centers for international 
law interpretation.  
The public choice analysis suggests that given the existing 
structure of decision making amongst sub-state actors, the pos-
sibility of the state behaving even ―as if ‖ a unitary actor is 
highly tenuous. Even focusing only on the executive branch, 
which presents the best possibility for unitary behavior, the un-
itary model has serious limitations, and the disaggregation be-
comes even more acute when considering the role of Congress, 
the courts, and private organizations. An evaluation of the be-
havior of legal departments within the executive branch reveals 
a diversity and complexity of inputs, as well as evidence of on-
going competition between conflicting viewpoints, that does not 
easily allow for a simple unified state model for international 
law compliance.  
Unitary theories of international law compliance run 
against basic understandings of domestic political behavior—
both constitutional and administrative—yet do not provide an 
explanation of how political behavior and bureaucratic 
processes may differ with regard to decisions about interna-
tional law. One cannot preclude the possibility that there may 
be mechanisms by which a well-ordered state can behave as a 
unitary entity and pursue rational or moral goals, but the pub-
lic choice analysis of these processes in the United States raises 
serious doubts about this possibility.266 At a minimum, propo-
nents of unitary theories have not explained how one can model 
a unitary state interest in these circumstances.  
The public choice model of international law compliance 
points out the limitations of unitary theories; however, it is 
more compatible with some theories than others, an unsurpris-
ing result given the diversity of unitary theories, which span a 
wide range of approaches to state behavior in international 
law.  
For example, public choice turns up little support for insti-
tutional cosmopolitanism, which assumes that the state has 
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moral obligations to comply with certain norms of international 
law.267 Such global responsibilities for human well-being as-
sume that states can act with concern for these higher goals. 
Yet in the sub-state process of decision making, who has the in-
centive or interest to raise moral concerns of global responsibil-
ity? The State Department at times expresses a moral or con-
science-based approach to international law, but it balances 
this with pragmatic, diplomatic imperatives. Undoubtedly 
there may be officials in the executive branch who believe the 
state should pursue certain forms of global welfare or who are 
committed to a generally cosmopolitan and expansive view of 
international law. These individuals and perhaps also some 
nongovernmental organizations may sometimes shape interna-
tional policy, but nothing in the actual operation of how the 
state negotiates competing interests of international law sug-
gests that sub-state actors systematically or even regularly 
pursue such interests.  
Scholars and advocates can argue that a state and its offi-
cials should pursue cosmopolitan interests, but such normative 
arguments must be distinguished from predictions that states 
can and will pursue global objectives because of their institu-
tional capacities. This institutional capacity must depend, in 
part, on the individuals running the institutions. Modeling the 
state as a unitary entity that will shoulder cosmopolitan re-
sponsibilities ignores the gritty reality of the process of interna-
tional law decision making—in which global responsibility, if 
present at all, will be one of a number of interests and agendas 
competing for the attention of centralized decision makers in 
the White House. The incentives of policy makers and lawyers 
tend to favor more pragmatic, instrumental uses of interna-
tional law that maintain flexibility for agencies as well as the 
White House.  
By contrast, the public choice analysis of international law 
compliance may be complementary to rational choice theories, 
such as Goldsmith and Posner‘s theory that state compliance 
with international law can usually be explained by rational or 
pragmatic reasons, rather than simply by a propensity to comp-
ly with international law.268 The public choice analysis ex-
 
 267. See supra Part I.B. 
 268. See GUZMAN, supra note 35, at 21 (―Once the domestic political process 
plays itself out, however, the state may pursue those policy goals on the inter-
national stage in a rational and unitary way. From this perspective, the liberal 
model serves as an input for the institutionalist model.‖); ERIC A. POSNER, 
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amines sub-state behavior, considering the incentives, inter-
ests, and agendas of executive branch agencies and their law-
yers. These interests reflect the rational calculation of actors 
within the bureaucracy based on the many factors discussed 
above. It suggests that agency officials responsible for inter-
preting and applying international law will respond, like all 
agency officials, to the incentives they face. In this case, perva-
sive competition for control of international policymaking creates 
strong incentives to treat international law instrumentally.  
Domestic bureaucratic processes help the President deter-
mine what constitutes a state interest, which the state then 
pursues in international relations. Furthermore, if such disag-
gregation is purposeful or serves important benefits, a unitary 
interest may develop after consideration of competing legal in-
terpretations. By explaining the interests and incentives of 
lawyers who help shape the development of state interests, dis-
aggregated public choice insights may be compatible with the 
conclusions that Goldsmith and Posner reach about rational 
state behavior. 
Public choice may serve as a complement to rational choice 
theory precisely because one of the difficulties with the rational 
choice model is that it does not provide much information about 
how a ―state‖ identifies or formulates its interests.269 Goldsmith 
and Posner address the complexity of state interests by pegging 
these to the ―preferences of the state‘s political leadership.‖270 
They acknowledge, ―[t]his assumption is a simplification and is 
far from perfect. But it is parsimonious, and it‘s appropriate be-
cause a state‘s political leadership, influenced by numerous in-
puts, determines state actions related to international law.‖271 
Moreover, they observe, ―institutions that translate individual 
preferences into particular policies are always imperfect, poten-
tially derailed by corruption, incompetence, or purposeful hur-
dles (like separation of powers), and sometimes captured by in-
terest groups.‖272 Although they recognize that there might be 
problems with the collective rationality of states, Goldsmith 
 
THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM 78 (2009) (noting some value to disaggregat-
ing states because the ―biggest problem with the unitary state model is that 
defining a state ‗interest‘ in the abstract, without any reference to the desires 
of citizens, interest groups, and elected officials, seems fruitless‖). 
 269. See Posner, supra note 74, at 835. 
 270. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 13, at 6. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. at 7. 
 266 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:194 
 
and Posner dismiss these concerns by noting that states devel-
op institutions ―that ensure that governments choose generally 
consistent policies over time—policies that at a broad level can 
be said to reflect the state‘s interest.‖273 Posner has explained 
that domestic processes are ultimately unhelpful for predicting 
state behavior.274 
Rational choice theory naturally raises the question of 
where state preferences come from and how they are formed.275 
Although the theory recognizes that the state has many differ-
ent interests including security, prosperity, and international 
stability, to name just a few, it does not provide an account of 
how those interests are prioritized or balanced.276 In addition, 
one factor that Goldsmith and Posner take little notice of is the 
possibility of the state being undermined by its own institu-
tions. The public choice analysis demonstrates that even if 
leaders formulate unitary preferences, they cannot always ful-
fill them because expansive and powerful bureaucracies may 
continue to operate either outside the White House or even at 
times in direct conflict with centralized policies. 
The public choice approach provides more detail about the 
interaction and competition of many different sub-state indi-
viduals and entities. The outcome of such processes may re-
main uncertain because of the difficulty of coordination. A state 
may comply with international law when in its self-interest—
but figuring out the state‘s interest will often require a closer 
look at domestic factors, including those discussed in this Article.  
Public choice gives us a different way of understanding 
even significant unitary action. It looks behind the state to see 
how agencies provide inputs for interpreting international law 
and formulating state policy. Moreover, if coordinating institu-
tions are purposefully disaggregated, designed to ensure ongo-
ing competition and uncertainty, this may affect how we con-
 
 273. Id. at 8. 
 274. Posner, supra note 74, at 833. 
 275. See Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and Revi-
sionism in International Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1404, 1429 (2006) (reviewing 
JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2005)).  
 276. Id. at 1439 (―[A]ll rationalist analyses leave open critical questions 
about the nature of the international system and the role of human agency, 
ideas, and preferences within it. Where do actors come from? How do they 
know what moves (in game-theoretic terms) are available to them? Where do 
their preferences come from? Rationalists ignore these issues for the purpose 
of simplicity, but in doing so they run the danger of assuming away some of 
the most important questions about the international system.‖). 
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ceptualize state interests. Institutions may be designed less for 
consistency and more for maximizing flexibility and respon-
siveness to particular circumstances. Unitariness suggests a 
sort of stability in the methods of interest formation, but public 
choice analysis posits that interest formation occurs through a 
constant process of competition and negotiation that may be 
less stable than unitary theories predict. 
B. EXPLOITING THE INDETERMINACY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In addition to highlighting some of the limitations of uni-
tary state theories, the public choice analysis in this Article of-
fers several predictions about the use and development of in-
ternational law.277 Disaggregated theories, like unitary ones, 
reach different conclusions about the development of interna-
tional law and the likelihood of compliance. The prevailing lib-
eral or disaggregated theories predict that a shift to domestic, 
non-state actors will result in greater precision and more com-
pliance with international law. Yet they do not explain how the 
transnational efforts of non-state actors will lead to greater 
state compliance. The non-state and sub-state activity they de-
scribe may indicate an increase in international cooperation, 
but this increase has no necessary connection to compliance 
with international law. 
By contrast, the public choice model focuses on decision-
makers who affect state choices about international law com-
pliance—it looks at the ―they‖ behind the ―it‖. An analysis of 
agency interests and incentives predicts that government offi-
cials will define compliance in instrumental terms that exploit 
the indeterminacy of international law. Officials will strategi-
cally use imprecision and uncertainty in international law to 
provide flexible interpretations that meet the needs of particu-
lar circumstances.  
1. Competition Creates Incentives for Flexible Interpretation 
The public choice analysis explains that agencies and their 
legal counsel often have different perspectives and interests 
 
 277. One of the criticisms of disaggregated theories is that they fail to pro-
vide any predictions and cannot generate a theory of compliance with interna-
tional law. ―The problem with disaggregating the state is that greater accura-
cy is purchased at the price of complexity.‖ POSNER, supra note 268, at 41; see 
also GUZMAN, supra note 35, at 19 (―It is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to 
construct a general, tractable, and predictive liberal theory of policymaking in 
a single state, let alone one that also captures the interactions of many 
states.‖). 
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and interpret international law in accordance with these. Im-
portantly, it also explains that in the absence of effective and 
predictable coordination mechanisms, agencies will compete to 
control international law interpretation. Competition between 
agencies creates pressure to interpret international law oppor-
tunistically in the light most favorable to an agency‘s preferred 
outcome. The public choice account predicts that agencies will 
strategically manipulate the indeterminacy of international law 
to advance their favored policy outcomes particularly with re-
spect to high-stakes issues and new circumstances. Moreover, it 
will often be rational for officials to seek out more soft law 
agreements and regardless of the degree of legalization, to 
press on points of uncertainty.278 
As discussed above, international law has varying degrees 
of softness.279 Such law exists on a continuum of legal obliga-
tion—some forms of international law have binding domestic 
effect, whereas others may create international, but not domes-
tic obligation. Moreover, international law exists on a contin-
uum of precision—some international law agreements may be 
precise and admit little interpretation, whereas other agree-
ments have much more general terms.280 Even though some 
traditional principles of international may be settled, disputes 
occur in areas of indeterminacy, whether as to the content of 
international law or its application in particular circumstances. 
Given this indeterminacy, government officials often have a 
wide range of potential interpretations.  
The range of possible interpretations is not without limit—
officials must ensure that their proposals comport with some 
plausible or defensible interpretation of international law. In 
practice, however, this will often allow for a legitimate range of 
disagreements over the application of law to specific circums-
tances. With the recent example of the Geneva Conventions, for 
instance, different agencies pressed for applicability or non-
applicability of the Conventions to al Qaeda and Taliban figh-
ters based in part on the law, its status as customary interna-
tional law, and also the political and diplomatic consequences 
 
 278. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 102, at 440 (discussing some of the 
public choice benefits of soft law). 
 279. Id. at 421. 
 280. See Abbott et al., supra note 104, at 405 (discussing legalization along 
dimensions of obligation, precision, and delegation; noting the ―remarkable 
variety‖ of forms of international legalization; and explaining that ―a binary cha-
racterization sacrifices the continuous nature of the dimensions of legalization‖). 
 2011] PUBLIC CHOICE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 269 
 
that would follow from the President‘s decision.281 The legal 
analysis related to the type and degree of obligation faced by 
the United States as well as the precision of the standard to be 
applied. Agency counsel then filtered the legal questions 
through a variety of diplomatic, security, and military consid-
erations and consequences.282 Similarly, with regard to the 
Libya intervention, Koh gave a narrow statutory interpretation 
of ―hostilities‖ in the War Powers Resolution, despite the fact 
that many argued the term should be read in light of interna-
tional norms, which provided a definition of hostilities that 
clearly covered the armed conflict in Libya.283 
As discussed above, agencies must compete with respect to 
issues in areas of overlapping jurisdiction. In the ongoing 
process of negotiation, agencies might use plausible interpreta-
tions of international law to attempt to defeat other agency 
proposals.284 According to a traditional empire-building account 
of agency behavior, agencies may say ―no‖ to the proposed ac-
tions of other agencies in order to bolster their importance. 
They may do this to thwart the action of other agencies, and/or 
to advance their preferred policies. Moreover, in the process of 
agency negotiation and compromise, alternatives that violate 
international law will be less likely to advance to the next level. 
There is little incentive for any particular bureaucrat or agency 
to advance a proposal that conflicts with or raises a question 
about international law. When many agencies compete to ad-
vance their own agenda, lack of compliance with international 
law provides opponents an easy impediment to competing poli-
cy proposals. 
Although failure to comply with international law may not 
necessarily block a proposal, it makes it more difficult for that 
proposal to get through the process. This dynamic provides an 
incentive for agencies to present their policies as compliant 
with international law. Compliance with international law does 
not have to depend on a unitary or centralized perception that 
 
 281. GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 102–20; YOO, supra note 1, at 18–47; 
Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, supra note 2. 
 282. See, e.g., Memorandum from Colin L. Powell, supra note 3. 
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such compliance is within the national interest. It may be simp-
ly that compliance with international law is efficacious on a 
domestic level. Advocating for international law compliance 
may be a strategic tactic—the domestic regulatory process may 
be easier to navigate if one‘s proposals arguably comport with 
international law.  
In high-stakes issues, agencies may have even greater in-
centives to bend international law interpretation to serve their 
interests. High-stakes issues include national security, the 
conduct of war, diplomacy, and any other issue important 
enough to attract White House attention. When an issue rises 
to the level of White House decision making, the agency dy-
namic may be somewhat different because the agencies are not 
only negotiating amongst themselves, but must also convince 
the President or other key decision-makers to adopt a particu-
lar interpretation or proposal. 
Agencies will sometimes strive to provide advice congenial 
to the President and White House, by placing great weight on 
the constitutional authority of the President and interpreting 
the requirements of international law in this light. This ap-
proach, often an institutional position of OLC but also adopted 
by other agencies, allows the widest scope for the President‘s 
policy assessment. Other agencies, such as the State Depart-
ment or Department of Defense have different missions and 
cultures and may selectively interpret the requirements of in-
ternational law more strictly in the contexts where this helps 
their objectives. For example, these agencies argued for the ap-
plicability of the Geneva Conventions to al Qaeda and Taliban 
fighters after September 11, 2001, based on legal interpreta-
tion, but also policy concerns about diplomatic stability and the 
treatment of American soldiers. Yet when seeking a legal justi-
fication for intervention in Libya without congressional autho-
rization, the State Department legal advisor provided an inter-
pretation of ―hostilities‖ under the War Powers Resolution that 
supported the White House‘s interests in Libya, but was at 
odds with the Department of Justice. Agencies at different 
times in and different circumstances provide the President and 
White House with advice that supports their foreign policy  
objectives. 
In the competitive process to direct presidential policy 
making, largely waged between political appointees within the 
White House and in high-level agency positions, the actual 
terms of international law ―compliance‖ may be defined down 
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in favor of presidential authority or pragmatic considerations of 
international policy. Government actors have incentives to use 
international law to their personal or agency advantage. In this 
environment, executive branch interpretations of international 
law will rarely remain fixed, but will vary depending on politics 
and the needs of changing circumstances. 
Agencies that fail in the competition for centralized control 
may persist in maintaining their own view of international law. 
Indeed, a commitment to international law compliance can pro-
vide a legal justification for what are, after all, acts of insubor-
dination, refusing to follow presidential direction or for under-
mining presidential decisions. For example, after President 
Bush announced his policy about the applicability of the Gene-
va Conventions, a memorandum explaining the State Depart-
ment‘s alternative legal analysis was leaked.285 Similarly, some 
officials in the Obama Administration have discussed internal 
executive branch disputes between the State Department and 
the Department of Defense with the New York Times.286 Agen-
cies may use international law as a justification for preserving 
their own course, citing fidelity to international law as a reason 
for failing to follow the President. 
These views may or may not be ―better‖ interpretations of 
international law, but they will aggravate the indeterminacy of 
international law. If two (or more) agencies within the execu-
tive branch maintain competing interpretations of internation-
al law, this furthers the perception and reality of the indeter-
minacy of international law. Such competition is likely to 
persist given the different perspectives of executive agencies 
and the incentives for sticking to one‘s position in a system 
with imperfect coordination.  
2. An Institutional Preference for Soft Law 
Repeated use of international law for political, strategic, 
and instrumental ends may create habits of flexible or instru-
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mental compliance. The predictions that follow from public 
choice analysis thus run against disaggregated theories that 
posit a shift to sub-state actors will lead to an increase in in-
ternational law compliance. For example, Harold Koh has ar-
gued international law is enforced by a ―transnational legal 
process‖ that involves both government officials and other non-
state actors.287 In particular, he observes that through interac-
tion with other nations and experience with international af-
fairs, government officials will develop a ―habit‖ of compliance 
with international law.288 This occurs in part because a ―state‘s 
violation of international law creates inevitable frictions and 
contradictions that hinder its ongoing participation within the 
transnational legal process.‖289 Similarly, Anne-Marie Slaugh-
ter identifies a process of networking between officials in dif-
ferent states that eventually leads to the formation of norms 
and greater compliance with international law both by non-
state actors and by states.290 
By contrast, the public choice account predicts that as gov-
ernment officials work through the requirements of internation-
al law in the process of formulating state policy, they will treat 
international law instrumentally, rather than as a moral imper-
ative or legal obligation. Competition creates incentives to keep 
the terms of international law flexible—this undercuts the idea 
that government actors internalize a norm of international law 
compliance. They may aim for ―compliance‖ with international 
law, but such compliance may be simply a commitment to the 
form of international law, rather than to its substance. Thus, the 
―institutional habit‖291 that Koh describes may be a commitment 
to ―compliance‖ that allows the government actor to interpret in-
ternational law with the maximum latitude depending on the 
circumstances. Indeed, Koh‘s recent interpretation of the War 
Powers Resolution, by ignoring international law altogether, 
perhaps confirms this tendency among government officials.292 
Compliance here does not mean that government officials 
will follow international law because of a moral obligation or 
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when such compliance is against their other interests.293 Ra-
ther it may mean simply that these officials will interpret in-
ternational law to fit with other interests. Moral considerations 
or a belief in the value of international law may drive some in-
dividuals, but there is little evidence that such legalistic-
moralistic feeling can be attributed to large numbers of policy-
makers. Ordinary experience suggests such feelings, to the ex-
tent they exist, must compete with other agency imperatives 
such as furthering the agency‘s mission or influencing White 
House decision making. Political calculations will invariably af-
fect how officials define and choose between lawful options. An 
instrumental commitment to compliance with international law 
fully accords with the rational interests of both substate actors 
as well as the ―state‖ as a unitary entity. 
C. SUSTAINING THE FLEXIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The public choice analysis predicts that agencies and gov-
ernment officials will use the actual or perceived indeterminacy 
of international law strategically in order to advance their 
agendas. In the American executive branch, this ongoing 
process expands the range of compliant behavior, which rein-
forces the flexibility and ambiguity of international law. If gov-
ernment officials in other countries face a similar type of com-
petition and incentive structure, these structural forces may 
provide one explanation for the persistence of indeterminacy 
and flexibility in international law.  
The public choice analysis of international law compliance 
thus reaches a different conclusion about the development of 
international law from other disaggregated theories. These 
theories predict that disaggregation will allow for the develop-
ment of global norms and standards that are more concrete and 
that states will be more likely to adhere to such norms through 
the actions of sub-state actors.294 In this view, minimizing the 
role of the ―state‖ allows individuals within government and 
outside of it to pursue global norms and cooperation.  
The general view is that disaggregation will lead to more 
legalization. For example, Anne-Marie Slaughter expresses op-
timism that the existence of disaggregated government net-
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works between nations will lead to the creation and enforce-
ment of more concrete international norms and greater cooper-
ation across nations.295 Slaughter also posits that government 
networks will ―improve compliance with international law‖ in 
part by using the enforcement mechanisms of national govern-
ment institutions to help the work of supranational institu-
tions.296 Similarly, Kal Raustiala suggests that transnational 
networks will enhance compliance through information-sharing 
and the export of ideas and technology, all of which improve co-
operation between nations.297 
These theories are based in part on the idea that substate 
actors will cooperate with their counterparts in other countries, 
particularly with regard to regulatory activities that are largely 
controlled by agencies in a decentralized fashion. If bureaucrats 
internalize norms of international law, as Koh suggests, the 
more disaggregated the decision making, the more likely these 
individuals can promote international law compliance. Moreover, 
these theorists suggest that disaggregation increases the possi-
bilities of international law, including bolstering supranational 
organizations and enforcement efforts. 
But it is important to properly describe the phenomenon 
observed by these liberal theorists. What Koh, Slaughter and 
Raustiala describe is largely the proliferation of cooperation be-
tween regulators and other officials that often do not take the 
form of binding obligations.298 Slaughter‘s transgovernmental 
networks ―negotiate, implement, and diffuse norms that are of-
ten precise and elaborate, and may be politically powerful 
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though not binding as a matter of [international law].‖299 The 
focus here is on disaggregation of international activity to in-
clude sub-state actors—this identifies the external transna-
tional work between government actors in different countries. 
Domestic agencies serve as international actors in their own 
right.300 From this proliferation of international norms, Slaugh-
ter and others predict that international law will become more 
precise and that there will be greater state compliance with in-
ternational law norms. 
Yet it is not clear how the proliferation of international co-
operation necessarily leads to harder forms of legalization or 
greater compliance by states. There appears to be an intuition 
that more working together across borders will lead to the soli-
dification of international law regimes, tighter international 
law obligations, and more compliance, but the mechanism of 
how this occurs remains unspecified. Indeed, one could just as 
easily predict that if non-state actors achieve their goals 
through soft legalization there may be little incentive to strug-
gle to achieve harder forms of international legalization.301 
Unlike disaggregated theories focused on transnational co-
operation, public choice analysis in this Article focuses on in-
ternal disaggregation in the American executive branch—the 
government officials who analyze and interpret international 
law. It couples this with institutional factors, such as the avail-
ability of coordination mechanisms. Given the often divergent 
agency interests and imperfect institutional coordination, go-
vernmental officials can benefit from ambiguity and flexibility 
in international law. Bureaucratic competition to control cen-
tralized decision making creates powerful incentives for keep-
ing international legal agreements and customary internation-
al law flexible and open-ended.302 Greater clarity in 
international law, both treaties and customary international 
law, would limit the range of policy alternatives in compliance 
with international law.  
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These sub-state actors, the ones who will negotiate, draft, 
and enforce international law norms, have an incentive to re-
tain the flexibility and ambiguity in international law. They 
may at times benefit from regulatory cooperation with their 
foreign counterparts or even from more precise norms. Yet most 
agency actors and legal counsel can benefit over time by retain-
ing interpretive flexibility because they do not know whether 
and how international law will limit future activities. Having a 
wide range of compliant alternatives allows officials to tailor 
legal analysis to meet policy objectives. 
A comparative study of international law compliance in 
other countries would allow us to predict whether this internal 
competition and incentives for flexibility are pervasive in na-
tions that formulate the terms of international law. If the bu-
reaucracies of other states have similar incentives to maintain 
the flexibility of international law, this would suggest a signifi-
cant difficulty with generating harder—more precise, more 
binding—forms of international law. It may be that other coun-
tries are different, or not as structurally disaggregated as the 
United States, but most liberal democracies also have elaborate 
and diverse bureaucracies that might compete over the mean-
ing and interpretation of international law. The few available 
accounts of this suggest that this might be the case.303 If public 
choice yielded similar observations in other countries, this 
would help explain what we see in the world—many states and 
government officials call for greater specificity and enforcement 
of international law, but at the same time enter into agree-
ments that allow for interpretive flexibility.304 
The public choice account provides evidence of domestic 
competition between agencies and failures to coordinate that, 
at a minimum, should temper the optimism of disaggregated 
theories that suggest transnational networks will help develop 
global norms of behavior and increase compliance with interna-
tional law. With regard to predicting whether states will comp-
ly with international law, the public choice analysis focuses 
more directly on the agencies and actors who determine ques-
tions of state compliance. It focuses on agency interests and in-
centives given the persistence of imperfect coordination. In this 
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manner, the public choice analysis may better predict how and 
in what manner the state complies with international law. 
  CONCLUSION   
Over the past ten years, numerous legal disputes about the 
content and applicability of international law to the war on ter-
ror have been made public. Some statutes and judicial opinions 
cover these matters—but many significant questions are essen-
tially left to the executive branch. Here agencies with different 
interests and perspectives often disagree, particularly as new 
circumstances arise and there is little state practice or 
precedent to guide analysis. This dynamic has been largely 
overlooked in theories about international law compliance. The 
approach of this Article has been to demonstrate how the ―they‖ 
of the executive branch can function as an ―it.‖ Although the 
President may make a final legal and policy determination, he 
does so by drawing on the advice of executive branch agencies 
and entities designed to provide expert opinion on such mat-
ters. These agencies, however, will interpret international law 
in light of their different interests, outlooks, and incentives. 
This provides valuable information to the President about the 
range of legal, political, diplomatic, and military consequences 
of particular options. But institutional coordination of these in-
terests remains imperfect. The benefits of a full hearing may 
come at the cost of ongoing disagreement and insubordination 
even after the President has made a final decision. 
This dynamic has consequences for international law com-
pliance in the United States. In the competition for control over 
centralized decisions, agencies may use international law to 
suit their purposes—taking advantage of indeterminacy in in-
ternational law to further their goals. The persistence of insta-
bility and lack of coordination creates incentives to use interna-
tional law strategically. In the current environment difficult 
questions about the content and applicability of international 
law to the use of force will continue to arise. Analyzing the con-
sequences of executive branch legal interpretation provides 
another way to understand the limits and possibilities of inter-
national law compliance in these new contexts. 
